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I. INTRODUCTION
It has become apparent that there are serious deficiencies in the
American model of production. Our model of corporate governance
has recently come under intense scrutiny in the academic literature' and
the popular press.2 There are increasing concerns that American
corporations are too focused on short-run profits and stock prices, at the
expense of long-term strategies and investments that would benefit the
long-run value of the firm, employees, and the American economy at
large.3  In the pursuit of short-run shareholder interests, American
corporations have bestowed on senior executives enormous
compensation packages that seem increasingly divorced from any notion
of rationality, let alone equity. At the same time, there is increasing
concern that our system of labor relations is yielding declining benefits
for workers and undermining the position of the American economy as
1. See WILL HUTTON, THE STATE WE'RE IN 18-19 (1995); Thomas A. Kochan,
Addressing the Crisis in Confidence in Corporations: Root Causes, Victims, and Strategies for
Reform, 16 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 139,139 (2002); Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management
Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices, 4 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC.
75, 75-76 (2005); Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in
Industry, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1992, at 4,4-16.
2. See Stevenson Jacobs, Goldman Sachs's Board Rejects Shareholder Demands To Cut
Excessive Pay, Bonuses, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2010/03/01/goldman-sachs-board-rejec._n_480434.html#; Nelson D. Schwartz, Insiders Bail,
Stockholders Suffer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, at B2. These criticisms and the analysis of
this essay are limited to large American corporations in which ownership and management
are divided. Small owner operated companies do not suffer these problems.
3. See HUTTON, supra note 1, at 11-12; Porter, supra note 1, at 4.
4. As early as 1984, Peter Drucker, the "guru" of modem management persuasively
argued that American CEO pay had rocketed out of control and implored boards to hold
CEO compensation to no more than 20 times what the rank and file made. What particularly
enraged him was the tendency of corporate managers to reap massive earnings while firing
thousands of their workers. "This is morally and socially unforgivable," wrote Drucker, "and
we will pay a heavy price for it." John A. Byrne & Lindsey Gerdes, The Man Who Invented
Management, Bus. WK., Nov. 28, 2005, at 97-102; see also Rik Kirkland, The Real CEO Pay
Problem, FORTUNE, June 30,2006, at 78 ("Voters are outraged. Big investors are demanding
change. Even some CEOs admit there's a crisis. But rewards that defy all economic logic
don't simply spring from greed. Corporate America's executive-compensation system is
broken.").
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a whole. Workers' wages and benefits have been stagnant-or even
declining-for decades, increasing income inequality in our economy as
risks of job loss, medical expenses, and training obsolescence have
devolved from employers to employees! At the aggregate level,
personal debt levels are at all-time highs while we suffer burgeoning
trade deficits and the loss of vital jobs overseas."
Although there are many factors that contribute to these problems,
there is at least one underlying cause-the under-representation of
employee voice in the American economy. Among the three founding
corporate stakeholders, shareholders, management, and labor, the
interests of labor are treated as subordinate and less important. In the
American model of corporate governance, the shareholders and
management are perpetually allied, leaving labor to fend for its interests
largely through individual bargaining.! This subordination of labor in
firm governance leaves the shareholders without an important in-house
ally in the monitoring of management performance and leaves
management without an important long-term ally in considering the
merit of long-term strategies and investments.! Similarly, within the
American system of labor relations, labor's interests are treated as
5. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2008/2009, at 58
fig.1G, 128 tbl.3.2 (2009).
6. Although government debt and non-financial business debt have remained relatively
stable for the past 50 years and each accounted for debt amounting to about 50% of GDP,
since 1980 household debt has increased from roughly 50% of GDP to about 100% of GDP,
while financial sector debt has increased from about 15% of GDP to over 100% of GDP. As
a result of this private borrowing, total debt in the U.S. has risen from slightly over 150% of
GDP in 1980 to slightly under 350% of GDP in 2008. Henry Blodget, Our Debt Problem,
Explained, Bus. INSIDER, Apr. 4, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/henry-blodget-our-
de-2009-4. Over the same period, the US balance of trade has gone from approximately a $20
billion deficit in 1980 to a $700 billion deficit in 2008. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FOREIGN
TRADE DIVISION, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.txt. As the
trade deficit soars, more and more jobs go overseas.
7. Cf Gregory Jackson et al.,. Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany:
Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
LABOUR MANAGEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 84,105-20 (Howard Gospel &
Andrew Pendleton eds., 2005) [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
8. Id. at 96-97; see also Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate
Combinations: The Case for Nonbinding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions,
85 WASH. U. L.R. 871, 900 (2007) (stating that employees are a natural fit in the role as
information provider even though there is a general lack of unionization among private sector
employees); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283,
301 (1998) (highlighting that an employee knows where his skill and labor are allocated and is
in an ideal position to observe the important indicators of management strategy and
performance); Antoine Rebdrioux, Does Shareholder Primacy Lead to a Decline in
Managerial Accountability?, 31 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 507, 521 (2007).
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subordinate. For the most part, the terms and conditions of
employment are set by management through a unilateral offer without
any express voice by the employees.! Employee interests are, once
again, left to the vagaries of individual bargaining and the inefficient
signaling mechanism of exit.0 Once the terms of employment are
offered and accepted by performance, employees are left with no
effective means of enforcing those rights, short of suing their employer.n
The subordination of employee interests in labor relations ensures that
those interests are not adequately represented, increasing turnover and
ensuring under-consumption of public goods in the workplace.
In this essay, I will examine the problems caused by the current lack
of employee voice in American corporate governance and labor
relations. In Part II, I discuss the current state of corporate America,
including both our system of corporate governance and our system of
labor relations. In Part III, I discuss the current problems in the
American system of production. Although the problems of the
American system of production are much broader than just our most
recent setbacks, a discussion of the near collapse of our financial sector
and the Great Recession will feature prominently in this exposition. In
Part IV, I discuss alternative formulations of corporate governance and
labor relations and the potential benefits of promoting employee voice.
Examples are drawn from the law and practice of corporate governance
and labor relations in Germany and Japan. In Part V, I present
proposals for amending American law to promote employee voice in
our corporate governance and labor relations. Although a proposal to
promote employee voice by necessity must favor the interests of labor
over those of capital, in my proposal I attempt to include a balance of
initiatives, some of which will probably appeal to employers. My hope is
9. Spiros Simitis, The Case of the Employment Relationship: Elements of Comparison, in
PRIVATE LAW AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 181, 187-88 (Willibald
Steinmetz ed., 2000); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the
Workplace: The Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.
313, 329 (2007).
10. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 7-16
(1984); Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 PUB. INT.
69,70-72(1979).
11. For a discussion of the difficulties facing employees who wish to sue their current
employers, see Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 19-25 (2005); Nantiya
Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive Payments to Named
Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 395,
396-97,410-11 (2006).
12. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10, at 14-16; see also Freeman & Medoff, supra
note 10, at 72-78.
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to not only present a workable collection of proposals, but also one that
is politically feasible. Finally, I close with my conclusions.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF CORPORATE AMERICA
A. The Shareholder Value Model of Corporate Governance
For the last three decades, the dominant model of corporate
governance in the United States has been the "shareholder value"
model of governance. The model's theoretical underpinnings were
established in the academic literature of the '70s and '80s," but its
biggest proponents were probably corporate leaders such as Jack Welch,
the CEO of General Electric from 1981 to 2001, and Roberto Goizueta,
the CEO of Coca-Cola from 1981 to 1997. Under this model, the sole
objective of corporate management is to "serve shareholder interests"
by endeavoring to maximize the value of corporate stock." It is
assumed that the interests of other possible stakeholders in the firm,
such as consumers and employees, will be met in the quest of
maximizing share value." By providing customers with the goods they
want and retaining valuable employees, management will increase the
profitability of the firm and so the share price. It is also assumed that
maximizing share price will appropriately balance the short-run and
long-run interests of the firm." If management adopts policies that do
not adequately take account of the long-run interests of the firm, the
13. See generally ALFRED RAPPAPORT, CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THE NEW
STANDARD FOR BUSINESS PERFORMANCE 1 (1986); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). For a modem view, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modem Corporation, 34 J.
CORP. L. 99, 143-44 (2008); Michael C. Jensen, How to Pay Bosses, ECONOMIST, November
16, 2002, at 60, 60 (2002).
14. In the popular literature, the origin of the model is often attributed to a 1981 speech
Jack Welch gave to financial analysts at New York's Pierre Hotel, shortly after taking the
helm at GE, entitled "Growing Fast in a Slow-Growth Economy." In the speech Welch
argued that lagging businesses-those not No. 1 or No. 2 in their markets-should be "fixed,
sold, or closed" and asserted that GE would "no longer tolerate low-margin and low-growth
units." Welch boasted that GE "will be the locomotive pulling the GNP, not the caboose
following it." Although in his 1981 speech Welch never actually used the term "shareholder-
value," he made it clear that his number one goal at GE was consistent earnings growth and
his report card for this effort would be stock price. Welch became the star of the shareholder
value movement. Betsy Morris, The New Rules, FORTUNE, July 24,2006, at 70,72.
15. RAPPAPORT, supra note 13, at 1; Roger Martin, The Age of Customer Capitalism,
HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2010, at 58,60-61.
16. Martin, supra note 15, at 60-61.
17. Id. at 61-62.
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market will realize this and the value of the firm's stock will drop.
To closely ally management interests with shareholder interests,
firms adopted management compensation schemes that included
lucrative performance bonuses and stock options."8  Under these
schemes, management directly benefits from any increase in firm stock
price and thus management and shareholder interests coincide. Should
these compensation mechanisms fail to adequately motivate managers
to serve shareholder interests, an active market for corporate control
provides a back-stop.19 If the firm's current management does not
follow production and labor relations policies that maximize share
value, then corporate raiders will have incentive to buy control of the
firm and amend corporate practices with new management and
management policies that increase stock price.
There are at least three important problems with this model of
corporate governance. First, the model is highly dependent on the
existence of perfect capital markets for some of its bolder claims. It is
assumed that stock traders act rationally on the basis of perfect
information so that current share prices represent an accurate
evaluation of the firm's current management policies and the firm's
short-run and long-run strategies.0 Recent experience in the financial
sector suggests that capital markets are far from perfect in either the
available information or the rationality of the participants. Firm stock
prices are driven by shareholders' expectations about future earnings,
with traders buying stocks if their expectations are high relative to the
current price and selling them if their expectations are low relative to
the current price.21 If a business is doing well, shareholders will ratchet-
up their expectations, eventually to a point that cannot be met, so that
stock prices fall regardless of management and firm performance.
Peoples' expectations suffer from a "herd mentality" or "animal
spirits"' so that they are both overly optimistic about advances and
overly pessimistic about declines." Thus, it is impossible to continually
18. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13, at 353; Martin, supra note 15, at 60.
19. Martin, supra note 15, at 60.
20. RAPPAPORT, supra note 13; Martin, supra note 15, at 61.
21. Martin, supra note 15, at 61.
22. Use of the term "animal spirits" to describe this phenomenon is attributed to John
Maynard Keynes. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST AND MONEY 161 (1936). For a more recent discussion of this term, see generally
GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM
(2009).
23. Martin, supra note 15, at 61.
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increase shareholder value and any management team that takes this as
its credo is on a fool's errand. Of course American management is no
one's fool, they realize that stock prices are cyclical and the best they
can do is make changes that raise short-run expectations and stock
prices and then cash in their stock options and get out before the
inevitable crash.*4  Such an alignment of management's interest with
short-run "get rich quick" schemes is not in the interests of
shareholders, employees, or the U.S. economy at large.
Second, the model fails to make use of important long-run interests
and insider information that the managers and employees have about
the operation of the firm. It implicitly assumes that, through stock
prices, stock traders have the same interests as customers and
employees of the firm and that they can know as much, or even more,
about the efficient short-run and long-run operation of the firm as the
management and employee insiders who actually operate the firm. In
American corporations, management and shareholders are permanently
allied and enter the market to buy labor as a commodity. Manager
interests have been co-opted by shareholder interests in the short-run
price of firm stock, and employee interests have been completely
subordinated and left to protection only by individual bargaining, exit,
and an imperfect market for stock prices. Under this system of
governance, the firm forfeits important long-run interests in favor of
short-run stock prices, and the shareholders give up employees as a
valuable inside ally in the monitoring of firm management. Nimble
capital, which in the information age can be transferred across the globe
in the blink of an eye, does not have the same long-run interest in the
firm as either the employees or the managers. As a result, American
corporations do not adequately take account of long-run strategies, and
investments that would benefit the firm, employees and society at
large.' Moreover, shareholders do not have the same access to
information on the running of the firm as the two inside players, labor
and management. As a result, they end up paying their top
management ever increasing amounts of money, which are more and
24. Id. at 61-62.
25. RAPPAPORT, supra note 13, at 6; Martin, supra note 15, at 61.
26. For example, it has been suggested that American corporations do not adequately
invest in market position, product improvement, or product quality. Howard Gospel &
Andrew Pendelton, Corporate Governance and Labour Management: An International
Comparison, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 1, 14-17; Jackson et al., supra
note 7, at 96-97.
2011] 771
HeinOnline  -- 94 Marq. L. Rev. 771 2010-2011
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
more divorced from actual firm performance.'
Finally, it has been argued that both the effort to maximize share
value and the permanent alliance of capital and management that occur
under the American model work to the detriment of employee interests.
The focus on maximizing shareholder value is thought to have a
distributional impact on the proceeds of the firm favoring the capital
and management alliance because firms have a limited capacity to
realize real increases in returns." In other words, the focus on
shareholder value shifts the claims against the firm in shareholders' and
management's favor, but it does not increase the surplus actually
generated by the firm, and may actually decrease it." Moreover,
because of the focus on share value and the permanent management-
capital alliance, efforts to increase share value come largely at the
expense of labor, often in the form of employee layoffs.o Because
production is organized by management and capital for the primary
benefit of capital, labor is left to absorb the ups and downs of the
market through layoffs. Hall and Soskice have suggested that weaker
legal protection for job security in the United States facilitates this shift
of risk from capital to labor.3' There is also a growing body of empirical
work questioning whether absorbing financial downturns through
layoffs is good for the long-run performance of the firm.32 By relying
27. As CEO of Coca-Cola, Roberto Goizueta became the first corporate manager to
become a billionaire on the basis of stockholdings in a company he neither founded nor took
public. At the time of his retirement from GE, it is estimated that Jack Welch owned over
$900 million of the company's stock. Martin, supra note 15, at 62. At least these CEOs were
successful, but under our system of executive compensation even mediocre executives or
failures are richly rewarded. As Warren Buffett said in the 2005 Berkshire-Hathaway annual
report: "Too often, executive compensation in the U.S. is ridiculously out of line with
performance. That won't change, moreover, because the deck is stacked against investors
when it comes to the CEO's pay. The upshot is that a mediocre-or-worse CEO-aided by his
handpicked VP of human relations and a consultant from the ever-accommodating firm of
Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo-all too often receives gobs of money from an ill-designed
compensation arrangement." Scott Brown, Excessive Executive Compensation: When is Too
Much, Too Much?, INVESTMENT U, June 8, 2009, http://www.investmentucourse.com/iu-
course/executive-compensation/; John Schroy, Warren Buffett Attacks Buyback Schemes,
CAPITAL FLOW WATCH, June 16, 2006, http://capital-flow-watch.net/2006/06/16/warren-
buffett-attacks-buyback-option-schemes/.
28. Gospel & Pendleton, supra note 26, at 14.
29. Id.
30. Julie Froud et al., Restructuring for Shareholder Value and Its Implications for
Labour, 24 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 771, 776 (2000).
31. Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE 1, 16 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
32. WAYNE F. CASCIo, RESPONSIBLE RESTRUCTURING: CREATIVE AND PROFITABLE
[94:765772
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primarily on layoffs to absorb economic fluctuations and maintain short-
run profits, firms lose valuable employees and their human capital
investments in the firm, discourage employees from making human
capital incentives in the firm, and increase distrust and turnover among
retained employees.'
B. The Individual Contract System of Labor Relations
Since the birth of the republic, the American system of labor
relations has been dominated by individual contract. With the industrial
revolution and the de-skilling of jobs through "scientific management"
and the development of the assembly-line, management gained valuable
bargaining power over individual employees.' American courts
buttressed employer bargaining power and management control by
embracing the doctrines of "freedom of contract"" and "employment-
at-will."" The strict adherence of American courts to the doctrine of
freedom of contract not only allowed employers to fully exploit their
bargaining power in individual contracts but also, for a time, was
constitutionally enshrined under the Lochner doctrine and used to
prohibit employee protective legislation.37 The Lochner doctrine could
ALTERNATIVES TO LAYOFFS 1-5 (2002); Jeffrey Pfeffer, Lay Off the Layoffs, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 15, 2010, at 32.
33. See generally JEFFREY PFEFFER & ROBERT I. SUTrON, HARD FACTS, DANGEROUS
HALF-TRUTHS, AND TOTAL NONSENSE: PROFITING FROM EVIDENCE-BASED
MANAGEMENT (2006); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 902,
915, 925-27 (1993); Pfeffer, supra note 32, at 34-37.
34. KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORKPLACE 26-29 (2009); see KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 27-41 (2004).
35. The at-will rule was first identified by Horace Wood in an 1877 treatise on the
master-servant relationship. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND
SERVANT 272-73 (1877). Mr. Wood's reading of American case law in identifying the rule
has been subject to more than a little criticism. See Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976) (stating that the
rule has doubtful antecedents); Theodore J. St. Antoine, You're Fired!, HUM. RTS., Winter
1982, at 32, 33-34. But see Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and
Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679, 681-82
(1994).
36. Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 1908); Jay M.
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 118
(1976).
37. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), the Supreme Court struck down a
New York statute limiting to sixty the number of hours bakers could work in a week, under
the theory that this limitation unconstitutionally infringed on the employers' and employees'
"liberty" to contract for longer work hours, as protected in the 14 th Amendment. The Court
2011] 773
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not survive in a modern economy because a national economy requires
national regulation of the employment relationship to ensure economic
stability and growth.& However, even in the days since Lochner's
repudiation," the doctrines of employment at will and unilateral
contract have combined to give American employers extraordinary
power in determining and changing the terms and conditions of
employment through individual bargaining. Under the most rigid
interpretations of these doctrines, unless the parties expressly state
otherwise, the employer can end the current employment relationship at
any time for any reason and unilaterally offer new terms which the
employee "accepts" by continuing to work to support his or her family."o
reasoned that the state could only infringe on such liberty pursuant to a valid exercise of its
police power to protect vulnerable classes of people, regulate particularly dangerous activities
or safeguard the general health and well-being. During what would later be known as "the
Lochner Era" the Court used its theory of "substantive due process" under the 5" and 14'
Amendments to strike down over 200 federal and state statutes which, in its view, impinged
on liberty and freedom of contract without adequate justification. Some of the most notable
of these cases include Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (invalidating section 10
of the Erdman Act prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts), Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26
(1915) (invalidating a state statute prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts), and Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 539, 543, 562 (1923) (invalidating a federal statute
establishing a minimum wage for women and children in the District of Columbia).
38. As the economy continued to grow and develop into a national economy, the
problems of ham-stringing federal and state legislative power under the Lochner doctrine
became more and more apparent. See KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT, ET AL., supra note 34, at
32-39, 63; James Gray Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to
Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (1987).
39. The first major realignment on the constitutionality of New Deal legislation occurred
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 386, 389, 400 (1937), when Roberts joined
Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Louis Brandeis, Benjamin N. Cardozo, and Harlan Fiske
Stone to uphold a Washington State minimum wage law, five to four. The same majority
upheld the constitutionality of the Wagner Act on April 12, 1937. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
40. ALVIN L. GOLDMAN, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
133 (1996). Most jurisdictions have developed some exceptions to the at-will doctrine to
limit the most egregious instances of employer misbehavior in discharging employees, for
example giving the employee a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge when he is fired for
refusing to violate the law, Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25,
26, 28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), or in order to avoid paying the employee commissions or
benefits that have already been earned, Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1253 (Mass. 1977). However, these cases generally don't limit the employer's ability to
use the at-will doctrine to end one set of terms and conditions of employment and begin
another. In this regard there have only been a very limited number of cases suggesting that
employers might need to give "reasonable notice" in order to eliminate prior promises of job
security of indefinite duration, see, e.g., Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 443 N.W.2d 112,
113 (Mich. 1989) (holding that the employer, upon reasonable notice to employees, may
modify employee handbook to provide for employment-at-will), or to impose new
requirements that impinge the employee's constitutional right to privacy, Luedtke v. Nabors
774 [94:765
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Employees' only recourse is to go elsewhere, based not on what they
have accomplished for their current employer, but instead on the
promise of what they will do for a future employer, a promise that
inevitably fades with age." The rise of global production using the new
information technology has further undermined employees' ability to
achieve significant input into their jobs through individual bargaining.
Although individual bargaining may have served the colonists and
frontiersmen well when labor was scarce and new opportunities were
just over the horizon, in today's "flat world" economy in which
Americans compete with workers in developing countries across the
globe, cheap labor undermines every deal.42
Collective bargaining is of limited and declining importance in the
American system of labor relations. Although worker organization and
collective bargaining have been a part of American labor relations since
colonial times, union density has never exceeded 33.2% in the private
sector and has been declining, more or less steadily, since that zenith
was reached in 1955. Today less than 7% of private sector employees in
the United States are members of a union. 3 Under the "New Deal" of
the 1936 Wagner Act. it was the policy of the United States to foster
Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1225-26 (Alaska 1992) (holding that the employer was
required to give "reasonable notice" before it could impose new drug testing requirement on
employees).
41. Laid-Off Middle-Aged Workers Face Job-Finding Ordeal, THIRDAGE.COM, May 8,
2009, http://www.thirdage.com/age-discrimination/laid-off-middle-aged-workers-face-job-
finding-ordeal; Richard Sennett, Middle-Aged, Middle-Class, Stranded by the New Economy,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at 17.
42. In the 1990s the global labor market experienced a near doubling of the relevant
labor force with a concomitant downward pressure on wages and benefits. Since 1990, the
collapse of Communism, India's turn from autarky, and China's adoption of market
capitalism have led to an increase in the relevant global labor force from 3.3 billion to 6
billion. Because all of these countries are relatively capital poor, their entry into the global
economy has brought no corresponding increase in global capital, and as a result, the capital-
to-labor ratio in the global economy has dropped approximately forty percent. See RICHARD
B. FREEMAN, AMERICA WORKS: THE EXCEPTIONAL U.S. LABOR MARKET 128-40 (2007).
This abrupt change in the ratio of available labor and capital in the global economy has put
tremendous downward pressure on wages and benefits on workers in developed countries
that are subject to global competition. The downward pressure on wages and benefits exists
not only in manufacturing, but in any service in which work can be digitalized and sent to
qualified people elsewhere in the world. Id.
43. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members 2009, 7 tbl.3 (Jan. 22,
2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_0122 2 010.pdf. Because
union density is higher in the public sector (41.1%), the overall union density rate for the
United States in 2009 was 12.3% or 15.3 million members. Id. at 1.
44. Wagner Act, ch. 372, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (Codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
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employee organizing and collective bargaining, thus promoting
employee voice through "industrial democracy." 45 Collective bargaining
was viewed as a useful mechanism that would allow employees to
bargain with employers on an equal footing, while still allowing
decentralized solutions to the problems of the workplace that were
derived by the parties themselves and which minimized regulatory
intrusion.' However, beginning with the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),' national
labor policy lapsed into one of, at best, benign indifference to employee
organizing and, at worst, one favoring employer property rights over the
right to organize.
At the same time federal policy was regressing to a state of
indifference or even hostility with respect to employee organizing, the
employment relationship was undergoing dramatic changes that would
further reduce the relevance of the National Labor Relations Act to
labor relations. By employing the new information technology,
employers have been able to invest in and organize production across
the globe in ways that subject American labor to a global market not
previously experienced.49 These new methods of organizing production
have undermined the corporate administrative rules, long-term
employment relationships, and even the notion of "employee" upon
which the NLRA system of collective bargaining was founded.? As a
45. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 41-42
(1983); ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 87 (11th ed.
1991) ("[Clollective bargaining replaces the weakness of the individual in bargaining and ...
substitutes . .. industrial democracy ... for the unilateral and sometimes arbitrary power of
the employer."); 1 JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 16 (1974) (quoting letter from Sen. Robert F. Wagner to the Honorable Marion
Smith dated Oct. 22, 1933, where Sen. Wagner wrote that program was designed to "make
America safe for industrial democracy").
46. ATLESON, supra note 45, at 40-43; FRANK W. MCCULLOCH & TIM BORNSTEIN,
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 18-20 (1974).
47. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, Pub. L. No. 80-
101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)).
48. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (upholding employer's right
to exclude union organizers who were not its employees from even public areas on the
employer's property); Trs. of Columbia Univ., 350 N.L.R.B. 574 (2007) (denying union's right
to e-mail addresses of employees at sea during election campaign because union e-mails
would use employer server).
49. PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET DRIVEN
WORKFORCE 103 (1999); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade
and Technology: Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. LJ. 1, 1-2 (2001).
50. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Changing Face of Collective Representation: The
Future of Collective Bargaining, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 903,905 (2007).
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result, even among the employees still represented by unions, collective
bargaining under the NLRA has become a less important factor in
determining corporate policies and the terms and conditions of
employment."
The most recent government effort to address workers' interests in
the employment relationship has been the modern movement to
develop a web of employee-protective legislation. Even before the
repudiation of the Lochner doctrine, some jurisdictions used their police
powers to adopt significant protective legislation in the form of child
labor laws,52 minimal health and safety regulations," and workers'
compensation laws." Lochner's demise, during the throes of the Great
Depression, not only allowed the New Deal program of wage and hour
regulation," unemployment compensation insurance," and social
security insurance," but also opened the door for the more recent
legislative developments of the 1960s, '70s, and '90s. Perhaps the most
important post-war legislative development with respect to the
employment relationship was the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
with its prohibitions on employment discrimination. Since that time,
Congress has enacted a number of important laws regulating the
employment relationship, including the Occupational Safety and Health
51. This decline in the relevance or organizing and bargaining under the traditional
NLRA system of collective bargaining has been well documented in the literature. PAUL C.
WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
249-50 (1990); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1527 (2002).
52. David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2003).
Even under Lochner, State courts routinely upheld child labor legislation. E.g., Ex Parte
Weber, 86 P. 809, 810 (Cal. 1906); Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 87 N.E. 229, 236 (Ind. 1909);
Bryant v. Skillman Hardware Co., 69 A. 23, 25 (N.J. 1908); State v. Shorey, 86 P. 881, 882 (Or.
1906).
53. For example, under Lochner, Oregon passed, and the Supreme Court upheld,
protective labor legislation favoring women. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908);
see also Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progressive Era:
A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63,64 (1985).
54. See generally Steven M. Ingram, Taking Liberties With Lochner: The Supreme Court,
Workmen's Compensation, and the Struggle to Define Liberty in the Progressive Era, 82 OR.
L. REV. 779 (2003). The United States Supreme Court found New York's workers'
compensation law constitutional in N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,209 (1917).
55. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat 1060,
(codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 201-219 (2006)).
56. The Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 301, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 626
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 501) (Unemployment Insurance).
57. Id. § 1 (Old-age Assistance).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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Act of 1970,"9 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,6
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act,6' and the
Family Leave and Medical Act of 1993.'
Although these statutes have placed important limitations on
employer discretion in the employment relationship, they provide only a
very crude and limited method for facilitating employee voice in the
methods of production and the terms and conditions of employment.
As represented in legislation, employee voice acts only indirectly,
through the votes of their elected representatives. Moreover, legislation
is subject to intense lobbying in which concentrated and well-financed
employer interests have distinct advantages. The decline of the
American labor movement has further undermined employee voice in
state legislatures and Congress, as membership rolls decline and the
weight of organized labor's legislative presence recedes." Legislation
provides only a crude tool for representing employee interests in the
workplace, providing only general guidance not carefully tailored to the
needs and preferences of the affected parties. Finally, national and
international competition undermines even efficient regulation, since it
may mean a loss of jobs. Even efficient regulation can place employers
at a competitive disadvantage in national and international markets,
encouraging the state legislatures and Congress to engage in a legislative
"race to the bottom" to preserve jobs.65
Even if employees do achieve some individual rights through
contract, the common law, or legislation, these rights can have only
limited effect because, generally, individual employees have no good
way to enforce these rights. Absent discharge, employees are hesitant
to strictly enforce individual rights because they fear alienating their
employer and incurring future retaliation in pay, promotion, and
retention decisions. As a result, the vast majority of employment law
cases arise only after discharge or the employee quits, making litigation
59. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. H§ 651-678 (1988).
60. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (1988).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
62. Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
63. See generally KEN SILVERSTEIN, WASHINGTON ON $10 MILLION A DAY: How
LOBBYISTS PLUNDER THE NATION (1998).
64. MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED
STATES 57-77 (1987).
65. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands of Workers into the Twenty-First
Century: The Future of Labor and Employment Law, 68 IND. LJ. 685, 686-87 (1993).
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little more than a very costly exit strategy without much additional
communication. Indeed, even after the employment relationship is
over, litigation costs make the enforcement of rights by individual
workers prohibitive for all but the most highly paid employees.'
Sometimes government agencies are charged with enforcing individual
employment rights, and this aids enforcement for low-wage employees,
but it is still true that with limited enforcement budgets, many
infractions of individual employee rights go unredressed. Finally, in the
enforcement of individual rights, employees are almost always "one-
shot" players while their opponent, the employer, is a "repeat player,"
with all the attendant advantages. It is well established in both the
socio-legal literature and the law and economics literature that repeat
players have advantages in experience and an interest in precedent
which allow them, collectively, to promote the evolution of the law to
their favor.67 In enforcing their legal rights, individual employees are
almost always inexperienced and without adequate motivation or
resources to look after their interests, while employers suffer no such
infirmities."
There is of course a proud intellectual tradition which advocates for
"freedom of contract" and individual bargaining, with a minimum of
government regulation, as a means of securing for people not only
liberty, but wealth. Although this intellectual argument stretches back
to Adam Smith," it finds ready representation in the neoclassical
analysis of economic theory and the work of more recent proponents
such as Milton Friedman' and Richard Epstein."' The basic argument is
that, at least in the context of competitive markets with perfect
information and zero transaction costs, the individual parties to a
contract know best their preferences and costs, and they will agree to
66. RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT 9 (1997); Dau-Schmidt & Haley, supra note 9, at 334-35.
67. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 95,97-104 (1974); Paul Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 55-56 (1977).
68. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Alternative Economic Analysis of the Regulation of
Unions and Collective Bargaining, in LAW & ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC
APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 201, 203-09 (Margaret Oppenheimer &
Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2005).
69. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 17-21 (Random House 1937) (1777).
70. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STATEMENT 2-7 (1980).
71. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947,
951-53 (1984).
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terms and conditions of employment only if the benefits of those terms
to the parties exceed their cost, thus maximizing wealth.,' If an
employer offers terms and conditions of employment that do not
adequately compensate his employees for the value of their
contribution, or asks them to work under conditions that are
inefficiently unsafe or arduous, the employees' remedy is to take a job
with another employer who will be glad to hire productive employees on
competitive terms and make a profit.3 In a competitive labor market
with adequate information and insignificant transaction costs, employer
and employee self-interest will drive the market to a competitive
equilibrium in which each employee is paid the value of his or her
marginal product and ensures efficient working conditions while
maximizing societal wealth.74 Unions and protective legislation yield
only rent-seeking and inefficiency in production and consumption, as
they move the labor market away from competitive equilibrium.
Although there is no doubt that the market can be a very useful and
efficient mechanism for decentralized decision-making and the
organization of production through individual bargaining and contract,
once again there are important limits on this institution that must be
taken into account in the regulation of an efficient and just society. This
is particularly true in considering the employment relationship and the
machinations of the labor market, since people and their problems are
so much more marvelously complex than any good that might be traded
in a market. Far from being the finely tuned mechanism for allocating
resources and rewards described in neoclassical economic analysis, some
economists have argued that labor markets are always and everywhere
imperfect. This is evident in the fact that, contrary to the prediction of
the neoclassical model, labor markets never clear in that the
unemployment rate is never zero. Bruce Kaufman has persuasively
argued that the employment relationship would not even exist in the
absence of market imperfections since, in the absence of information
72. Id. at 951.
73. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 70, at 246.
74. As Adam Smith famously wrote on the virtue of self-interest "It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from
their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to
their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages." SMITH,
supra note 69, at 14.
75. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the
Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REv. 419,452-55 (1992).
76. Bruce E. Kaufman, The Non-Existence of the Labor Demand/Supply Diagram and
Other Theorems of Institutional Economics, 29 J. LAB. RES. 285, 293 (2007).
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and transaction costs, there would be no reason for companies to existO
or for one person to employ another.! As a result, it is somewhat
paradoxical to try to analyze the employment relationship and labor
markets within the context of a perfect neoclassical market.
In critiquing the neoclassical analysis, economists commonly begin
with several possible imperfections or "market failures" that undermine
the assumptions of neoclassical economic analysis-all of which have
relevance to the labor market and the employment relationship. First, it
seems evident that the reality of imperfect information often leads to
sub-optimal results.79 It may be that both the employer and the
employee suffer from the same lack of information, or that one of the
parties has an advantage in gaining information so that there is an
"information asymmetry" in the negotiation of the terms and conditions
of employment. For example, if employees do not understand that the
chemicals they work with will cause cancer in twenty years, they will not
ask for adequate compensating wages or look for safer jobs, and as a
result the employer will not have adequate incentive to make the
workplace safe. Another commonly cited market imperfection is
significant transaction costs." This would seem particularly important in
long, complex relationships such as the employment relationship where
it is too costly to completely and expressly specify all terms of the
relationship so that some terms remain implicit giving rise to incentives
for opportunism. For example, prior to the passage of ERISA,
employers had incentive to renege on their implicit promise not to
discharge employees before their thirty-year pension vested in order to
cheat the employee of that benefit. A final form of market failure that
is commonly attributed to the labor market is that many terms of
employment are "public goods."8' A public good is a good that is non-
77. Nobel laureate Ronald Coase has asserted that, in the absence of transaction costs,
firms would not exist. Instead people would conduct all business and production through
arm's length individual contracts. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA
386,388 (1937).
78. Bruce E. Kaufman, The Economics of Regulating the Labor Market, in LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 28-29 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al. eds, 2009)
[hereinafter LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT].
79. Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe, Employment Contracts, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
supra note 78, at 61, 83-86.
80. Benjamin Klein, Transaction Costs Determinants of 'Unfair' Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 356, 362 (1980); Kenneth R. Vogel,
Administering Labor Contracts Using Transaction-Costs Economics, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 129,
130-33 (1983).
81. John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, The Economic Effects of Employment
Regulation: What are the Limits?, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT
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rivalrous, in that many people can enjoy the same good, and non-
excludable, in that if one person enjoys the good they cannot exclude
others from also enjoying the good. Common examples in the
workplace include the speed of the assembly line, the cleanliness of
workplace air, the level of noise in the plant, and even the type of health
insurance the employer provides. The problem with public goods is that
the benefits of the good will be shared by all while the costs of
concessions to gain the good are born by the individual employee who
negotiates for them. As a result, in individual bargaining, each
employee has incentive to hold back and "free-ride" on the efforts of
others to gain the public good, with the result that too little of the good
is negotiated.
The criticism of the neoclassical analysis that economists rarely
discuss, but that occurs almost immediately to everyone else, is that
employers generally have much more bargaining power than their
employees.' Economists generally discuss imbalance in the
employment relationship only in cases in which there is a single
monopsonistic employer, but generally assert that such cases are rare.
However, it is evident that important imbalances in individual contract
negotiations can and do often exist in situations well short of a single all-
powerful employer. If you define bargaining power as the ability to
influence negotiations to gain a larger share of the benefits of the
bargain, a party's bargaining power depends on his or her alternatives
and the party's ability to resist agreement relative to the other party to
the agreement.8' In individual contract negotiations, employers
generally have more bargaining power because they have more choice
of employees than the employees have choice of jobs, and large
employers are usually not significantly inconvenienced by the loss of an
employee, while an employee loses his or her livelihood with the loss of
RELATIONSH IP 125,131-33,166-67 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
82. JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 48
(4th rev. ed. 1967); Karl Klare, Countervailing Workers' Power as a Regulatory Strategy, in
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 63, 63-82 (Hugh Collins et al. eds.,
2000).
83. A monopsonist is a buyer who enjoys market power because it is the only buyer, or
one of only a few buyers, in a market. As a result the employer recognizes its ability to set
wages and maximizes profits by cutting wages and cutting employment. William M. Boal &
Michael R. Ransom, Monopsony in the Labor Market, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 86, 86
(1997); ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR
MARKETS 3-4 (2003).
84. Kaufman, supra note 78, at 26-27,30-31.
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a job.m Moreover, labor is perishable in that a day of unemployment is a
day of labor (and wages) that is forever lost to the employee."
Employers also generally enjoy advantages in resources, information,
and legal rules. I have already discussed how American employers
enjoy advantages in the setting of the terms and conditions of
employment under the combined doctrines of employment at will and
unilateral offer and acceptance.V As a result of these advantages,
employers can hold out better in bargaining and enjoy advantages in
negotiation and enforcement of the agreement.
Some economists have also argued that there are macroeconomic
reasons why society might not want to leave the growth and direction of
the economy merely to the whims of individual bargaining. They point
out that the simple neoclassical model provides just a snapshot of the
labor market at one instance in time. In fact, the economy changes
dynamically over time and can grow or shrink as it "cycles up" or
"cycles down."" They argue that, by promoting stable employment and
better wages and working conditions, unions and protective legislation
encourage workers and employers to invest in the workers' training and
experience. Just as we want to promote profitable stable markets to
encourage small businesspersons to invest in their business, so too we
want to encourage profitable, stable labor markets and employment
relationships to encourage employers and workers to invest in the
workers' "human capital." By promoting investment in human capital,
society encourages the economy to cycle up to a higher equilibrium with
higher productivity and wages. Economists also argue that, through
strategic planning, a country can position itself and its industries in
international competition so as to use its current advantages to grow
into a more advantageous niche in the global economy." Rather than
going head-to-head in competition with low-wage countries in the
production of nails or other low-tech goods, a country might encourage
investment in companies that produce surgical tools or other high-tech,
high-quality goods that cannot be made by low-skill, low-wage labor.
85. Samuel Issacharoff has likened the case of an employee bargaining with an employer
to that of a monogamist bargaining with a polygamist. Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for
Employment: The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1795 (1996).
86. Kaufman, supra note 78, at 34.
87. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
88. Kaufman, supra note 78, at 36-46.
89. Id. at 41-46; Harold Meyerson, How Germany Got It Right on the Economy,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Nov. 24, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/11/23/AR2010112306280.html.
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Finally, some theorists have raised fundamental objections to the
neoclassical economic analysis, pointing out that human labor is not a
commodity." The labor of a human being requires the investment of a
portion of that person's life and, even though employment necessarily
requires some subordination to the will of another, human beings have
rights independent of any value of their labor as property or wealth.
Thus, for example, we do not allow slavery, or even allow people to sell
themselves into slavery, regardless of any possible impact such an
arrangement would have on efficiency or wealth.9' As a result, it is
imperative that we take account of values other than efficiency in the
regulation of the labor market. John W. Budd has summarized the
relevant concerns as efficiency, equity, and voice.? In other words, in
addition to trying to promote the efficient use of resources, when
regulating the employment relationship, we need to remember that
workers are people and try to promote equity between employees and
employers and give workers a voice in the relationship. These concerns
are lost in the simple neoclassical economic model.
III. THE RECENT FAILURES OF THE AMERICAN MODEL
Given the subordination of workers' interests in the American
systems of corporate governance and labor relations, it is not surprising
that those interests have always been less well served than the interests
of American management and capital. This problem has become
particularly acute recently with the near collapse of our financial system
and the rise of the global economy.
A. America's Recent Experience Under the Shareholder Value
Model of Corporate Governance
Beginning in the late 1990s the American real estate market seemed
a "sure bet" for steady appreciation into the foreseeable future. To
exploit this opportunity, financial institutions developed new mortgage
90. JOHN W. BUDD, EMPLOYMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE: BALANCING EFFICIENCY,
EQUITY, AND VOICE 43-44 (2004); 1 JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS
PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 266-67 (1934); BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE GLOBAL
EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: EVENTS, IDEAS AND THE IIRA 2 (2004).
91. Historical data suggests that slave labor on the large plantations of the antebellum
South was more productive than free labor on farms in the North, largely due to the gang
system and economies of scale. Patrick Belser, The Economics of Slavery, Forced Labor and
Human Trafficking, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 78, at 418, 423-24.
Nevertheless, we fought a just war to end this horrible institution.
92. BUDD,supra note 90, at 13.
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"derivative" instruments to aggregate mortgages and sell or insure
portions of mortgage returns and risks.3 These instruments were rated
by the American credit rating agencies of Moody's, Standard & Poor's,
and Fitch Ratings, and sold to financial institutions world-wide, but
especially in the "wild west," or "casino" atmosphere of the American
financial markets.' The top five U. S. investment banks-Lehman
Brothers, Bear Sterns, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill
Lynch-were all heavily invested in these derivatives with AIG
providing counter-insurance for these investments world-wide.' To
increase their profits in the mortgage business, the financial institutions
heavily leveraged their positions, borrowing and then loaning or
investing many times the amount of capital they actually held. In their
leveraged positions, the institutions stood to make huge profits on the
borrowed money, but would lose their capital if the deals turned sour.9
To meet the ever increasing demand for mortgage-backed securities,
banks and mortgage institutions made "sub-prime" loans to less reliable
borrowers with little or no money down, assuming that future real estate
price increases would collateralize the loans even if the borrowers
defaulted. Many of these loans were made with adjustable payments
that would increase over time or if interest rates rose. The fact that the
original lending institution could resell derivatives on these questionable
loans and would not bear the burden of the questionable lending
practices gave further impetus to the relaxation of lending standards.
93. Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by Another Name? The Challenge of Purely
Speculative Derivatives at 3-8 (Forthcoming, copy on file with the author).
94. Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the
Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 262-64 (2009); Kevin G.
Hall, Where Was Moody's Board When Top-Rated Bonds Blew Up?, MCCLATCHYDC.COM,
Apr. 2, 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/02/91419/where-was-moodys-board-when-
top.html#storylink=omni-popular.
95. Arvind Krishnamurthy, How Debt Markets Have Malfunctioned in the Crisis, 24 J.
ECON. PERSP. 3,4-13 (2010); Michele Fratianni & Francesco Marchionne, The Role of Banks
in the Subprime Financial Crisis 15 (Apr. 10, 2009) (unpublished comment on file with the
Review of Economic Conditions in Italy).
96. From 2004-2007, all five of these investment banks significantly increased their
financial leverage, which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. These five
institutions alone reported over $4.1 trillion in debt for fiscal year 2007. Stephen Labaton,
Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al.
97. BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 20-37 (2010); Bethany McLean & Joe Nocera, The
Blundering Herd, VANITY FAIR, Nov. 2010, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/business/
features/2010/11/financial-crisis-excerpt-201011; Fratianni & Marchionne, supra note 95, at
15.
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Inevitably the bubble burst and real estate prices began to decline in
America. As prices declined, the banks and mortgage institutions
suffered losses on the under-capitalized sub-prime loans that went
bad-an event that occurred with increasing frequency as the
borrowers' payments were adjusted up beyond their means or the value
of the now-depreciated property." The losses were serious enough that
in September 2008 the federal government found it necessary to take
over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ensure their continuance and the
availability of mortgage funds." Financial institutions around the world
who were invested in the new mortgage instruments also suffered losses
which, because of their heavily leveraged positions, threatened their
continued viability. In September 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson and the Bush administration decided to allow Lehman Brothers
to default, sending the company into bankruptcy.'"' The threat of
further bankruptcies among major financial institutions sent a panic
through the American financial market and dried up the credit market
as financial institutions declined to loan money to each other for fear the
borrower was over-invested in the new mortgage instruments. Panic in
the financial markets led to panic in the stock market, which was also
over-valued, resulting in substantial losses for those invested in stocks.''
To avoid a collapse of the money supply like the one that occurred in
1929-1930, the U.S. government undertook a massive effort to prevent
the failure of financial institutions by buying the risky mortgage
instruments or taking equity positions in the firms." At the time this
98. US Foreclosure Crisis Becomes More Widespread, BBC NEWS, Oct. 28, 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11646439; Luke Mullins, Strategic Defaults and the
Foreclosure Crisis, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPS., Jan. 19, 2010, available at
http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/real-estate/articles/2010/01/19/strategic-
defaults-and-the-foreclosure-crisis.html; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks
at the Columbia Business School's 32nd Annual Dinner: Mortgage Delinquencies and
Foreclosures May 2008 (May 5, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speechlBernanke2008O5O5a.htm.
99. Dawn Kopecki, U.S. Considers Bringing Fannie, Freddie on to Budget,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 11, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&
sid=adr.czwVm3ws&refer=home.
100. Paul Krugman, Moment of Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at A33.
101. Beginning "the Black week" on October 6, the Dow Jones industrial average fell
over 1,874 points over five sessions, or 18%, in its worst weekly decline ever on both a point
and percentage basis. The S&P 500 fell more than 20%. Volume levels were also record
breaking. Jonathan Sibun, Financial Crisis. US Stock Markets Suffer Worst Week on Record,
THE TELEGRAPH, Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financial
crisis/3174151/Financial-crisis-US-stock-markets-suffer-worst-week-on-record.html.
102. In October 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act,
which authorized the Treasury Department to spend $700 billion in the Troubled Asset
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essay is written, this effort seems to have avoided a collapse of the
magnitude that occurred before the Great Depression, although it also
seems likely that the recent problems in the credit markets and the
decline of the stock market will result in a decline in aggregate demand
and a significant slowing of the economy that will last for some time to
come.
Although there are a variety of factors that contributed to the
financial crisis of 2008,03 one has to ask why the managers of some of the
world's largest and most sophisticated financial institutions took such
extreme risks, from highly leveraged positions, dealing in uncertain
financial instruments that were only in the long-run interest of investors
and the economy as a whole if the American housing market became
the first market in the history of the world to never suffer a set-back in
prices? At its base, the answer is that, under the compensation schemes
of the share-holder value of corporate governance, it made sense for the
managers to invest in derivatives they hoped would yield further short-
run increases in stock prices, which they would be rewarded for in their
stock option bonuses, even though these investments could not be in the
long-run interests of the firm, the employees or the American
economy."
The failure of the investment banks, mortgage lenders and insurance
companies in the recent near collapse of our financial system are the
most dramatic example of the problems of our system of corporate
governance, but similar examples of penny wise, pound foolish
executive decisions litter the landscape of the American economy.
Eager to maximize the value of current stock options, American
executives have adopted numerous strategies to boost short-term stock
prices including undertaking risky "proprietary trading" strategies with
Relief Program (TARP) to combat the financial crisis. In July of 2010, the financial
regulation overhaul reduced the amount authorized for TARP to $475 billion. Of this total,
$69.83 billion was used to shore up AIG and $65 billion was used to shore up the investment
banks. Additional spending to secure personal mortgages also benefited the banks. For a list
of firms receiving TARP bailouts and the amounts see Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act. The TARP, PROPUBLICA.ORG, http://bailout.propublica.org/initiatives/2-emergency-
economic-stabilization-act (last visited Mar. 24, 2011).
103. Kevin G. Hall, supra note 94; Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, Moody's Faces
Possible SEC Action, WALL ST. J., May 8-9, 2010, at B2.
104. Nelson D. Schwartz, supra note 2, at B2. There is even evidence of out-right fraud
on the part of Goldman Sachs and other financial institutions in selling derivatives to
customers that the firm knew or at least were betting were going to fail. The SEC is
entertaining allegations that Goldman created and marketed securities that were deliberately
designed to fail, so that an important client could make money off that failure. Paul
Krugman, Looters in Loafers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,2010, at A23.
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credit default swaps and other derivatives; adopting massive stock-
buyback programs that drained much-needed capital out of firms; and
cutting payroll, health and safety measures, or research-and-
development budgets. Sometimes, such as in the Enron case, these get-
rich-quick schemes are accompanied by outright fraud in order to cover
questionable practices and allow executives to cash out their bonuses
before shareholders and employees are any wiser."os
The case of the investment banks and the recent financial crisis
presents a good example of the first strategy of undertaking risky
investments. Another common strategy is for management to use
corporate funds for massive stock buy-back programs designed to raise
stock price. Between 1980 and 2005, the amount of corporate funds
committed to stock repurchases has increased from $5 billion to $349
billion.'" Although there can be legitimate reasons for corporate stock
repurchase plans, including avoiding dilution of corporate ownership or
to gain tax advantages, the plans can also be used to give a short-run
boost to stock prices for the benefit of executive bonuses at the expense
of needed corporate cash liquidity. Shortages or corporate cash can
slow innovation and job creation at the long-run expense of the firm, the
workers, and society at largeY0 The growth and abuse of corporate
stock repurchases in recent years under the shareholder theory of value
model of corporate governance has left shareholders crying for reform
that limits such repurchases."
The American auto industry poses an example in which executives
have postponed important research and development at the long-run
expense of their workers and firms, in order to pursue short-run profits.
If there was any doubt that in the world of limited resources fuel
economy would eventually become of crucial importance in consumers'
car-buying decisions, the initial OPEC-induced gas price shocks of the
1970s should have removed all doubt. Despite this experience and the
damage done to the American car industry during that time, the Big
105. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275, 1277, 1283, 1286 (2002). See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND,
THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF
ENRON (2003).
106. Laurie Simon Bagwell & John B. Shoven, Cash Distributions to Shareholders, 3 J.
ECON. PERSP. 129, 131 (1989).
107. William Lazonick, The Buyback Boondoggle, BUS. WK., Aug. 24,2009, at 96.
108. John Schroy, Corporate Governance: Stock Buybacks Are Still Bad for Investors,
CAPITAL FLOW WATCH, July 7, 2010, http://www.capital-flow-watch.net/2010/07/07/stock-
buybacks-are-still-bad-for-investors/.
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Three Detroit auto executives pursued a course of short-run profits
based on large, relatively inefficient cars throughout the 1990s.'"
However, during this same time, Japanese auto company executives
realized that the future belonged to the efficient and undertook costly
investment in hybrid technology.o By the time the next set of gas price
shocks inevitably occurred in the early twenty-first century, the
Japanese were several years ahead on this important technology and the
world production of the high-quality batteries necessary for hybrid cars
was organized in Asia. As a result, not only have Japanese automakers
continued to capture a larger and larger share of the U.S. and world
markets, at the expense of American automakers,"' but Japanese,
Korean, and Chinese manufacturers make the valuable batteries
necessary for hybrid technology."' With the near collapse of the U.S.
financial markets and the advent of the Great Recession, two of the
three largest American auto manufacturers were forced to ask for
government assistance in order to survive."' The employees, as the
party with the longest term investment in the modern American
corporation, were left holding the bag and, many of them, losing their
jobs.
The recent accident and oil spill by British Petroleum at the
Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico is a good example of how
corporate governance under the shareholder theory of value can lead to
the adoption of safety procedures that may yield short-run cost savings
but are ultimately disastrous for the firm, workers and society at large."'
The U.S. Congress has released findings that reveal a pattern of reckless
109. Diane Francis, Detroit Bailout: Gas Buzzler Buyout, FIN. POST, Dec. 11, 2008,
http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/francis/archive/2008/12/11/detroit-gas-guzzlers.aspx.
110. Steve Schifferes, The Decline of Detroit, BBC NEWs, Feb. 19, 2007, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6346299.stm.
111. Toyota Overtakes GM in Global Vehicle Sales, MSNBC, Apr. 24, 2007, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18286221/ns/business-autost.
112. Bill Moore, Short Supply: American-Made Electric Car Batteries, EVWORLD.COM,
Dec. 07, 2008, http://www.evworld.com/article.cfm?storyid=1593; MARCY LOWE ET AL.,
LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES FOR ELECTRIC VEHICLES: THE U.S. VALUE CHAIN 6 (2010),
available at http://cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/LoweLithium-lonBatteriesCGGC_10-05-10_revised.
pdf.
113. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Sholnn Freeman, Help Us but Don't Call It a Bailout; GM,
Ford Pressing for Broad U.S. Aid One Huge Package Would Look Bad, TORONTO STAR,
Dec. 12, 2005, at G30; Aparajita Saha-Bubna, U.S. Auto Makers Seek Bailout for Bad Car
Loans, WALL ST. J., October 1, 2008, at B3.
114. Although British Petroleum is a British firm, firms in the United Kingdom have
also adopted the shareholder value theory of corporate governance aping American firms.
Gospel & Pendelton, supra note 26, at 2.
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and negligent behavior by BP."' This behavior appears to be
characteristic of a company that put growth ahead of safety for many
years."'6 In addition to the death of the eleven workers involved, the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill damaged the economy and ecology of the
Gulf of Mexico, resulting in liability that will severely damage the
financial health of the firm."7 As of June 2010, two months after the
ongoing Gulf Spill, BP's market capitalization had been halved."" Of
course the workers, as the party with the true long-term investment in
the enterprise, are dead.
As these examples demonstrate, the inordinate focus on the short-
run profitability of the firm that is fostered by our current system of
corporate governance has a negative impact on the long-run profitability
of the firm, the interests of workers, and the general health of the
American economy. Under our current system of corporate
governance, management's interest in short-run profits and maximizing
the value of their stock options causes them to sacrifice profitable long-
term investments in technology, human capital, and relationships for the
benefit of short-term gain. As a result, our industry suffers from too
little investment in long-term resources like long-term relationships with
productive workers, investment in human capital, and investment in
long-term strategies for the benefit of the firm and the American
economy as a whole.
115. See Letter from United States Congress Committee on Energy and Commerce to
Tony Hayward, Chief Executive Officer of British Petroleum (June 14, 2010), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-20100614-LetterToHayward.pdf.
116. Sarah Lyall, In BP's Record, a History of Boldness and Blunders, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2010, at Al.
117. BP faces up to $17.6 billion in civil fines, in addition to the $32.2 billion dollar
accounting charge it has taken to cover clean-up costs and the $20 billion it has put into
escrow to pay claims. Margaret Cronin Fisk & Laurel Brubaker Calkins, The Oil Spill Ends.
Now Come the Fines, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 9, 2010, at 26. In addition, BP
faces substantial claims for consequential damages. An Oxford Economics study
commissioned by the U.S. Travel Association estimates that the cost to the gulf coast region's
tourism industry will exceed $22 billion. OXFORD ECONOMICs, POTENTIAL IMPACr OF THE
GULF OIL SPILL ON TOURISM 2 (2010), available at http://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/
files/page/2O09/11/GulfOil_SpilLAnalysisOxford_Economics_710.pdf.
118. Gregory White, And Now BP's Market Cap Has Been Halved, Bus. INSIDER, June
9,2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/bp-market-cap-2010-6.
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B. The Slow Decline of the American Economy and the Economic
Position of American Workers Under Individual Bargaining
The United States emerged from World War II as the only intact
industrial power in the world."9 During this post-war period, America's
captains of industry determined that the "best" management practices
were to build large, "vertically integrated" firms, supported by a stable
workforce.'" Large, vertically integrated firms were best because they
allowed coordination of production methods and the realization of
economies of scale. Managers wanted a stable workforce to ensure their
supply of this valuable resource in coordinating production. To
maintain workforce stability, firms developed administrative rules for
the retention, training, and promotion of workers within the
organization. Economists refer to these systems of administrative rules
as the "internal labor market" because, although these decisions are
made in reference to external market forces, they define the terms of
compensation and promotion within the firm in a way that is not directly
determined by the "external" market.'" The vertical integration of firms
facilitated the retention of employees over the course of their careers
because integrated firms had layers of positions within the firm for
employee advancement. Thus, in the immediate post-war period,
employees could rely on their employers as an important source of
training and economic security throughout the course of their lives.
In the mid-1970s, the system of trade and technology that served as
the foundation for post-war labor relations began to change. With the
rebuilding of Europe and the rise of the "Asian tigers," international
trade began to make serious inroads into the American economy.1
Manufacturing jobs began to migrate overseas or disappear entirely as
industry strived to become more efficient. In the 1980s, new
119. Indeed, due to government investment during the war, the United States economy
was much stronger after the end of the war than before. STEPHEN A. HERZENBERG ET AL.,
NEW RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY: EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN
POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 7 (1998).
120. A classic example of such integrated production was Ford's River Rouge plant
where it was bragged that the process went "from iron ore to Mustangs, under one roof!"
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 50, at 909; see also CAPPELLI, supra note 49.
121. PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND
MANPOWER ANALYSIS 1-2 (1971); RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH,
MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 318 (1982).
122. Frances Lee Ansley, Rethinking Law in Globalizing Labor Markets, 1 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 369, 386-87 (1998).
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information technology accelerated globalization and allowed for the
efficient organization of firms horizontally across the globe.'"
Employers no longer had to be large and vertically integrated to ensure
efficient production; they just had to be sufficiently wired to reliable
subcontractors. The "best business practices" included outsourcing, and
subcontracting as firms concentrated on their "core competencies"-
that portion of production or retail that they did best.'24  In this
economic environment, employers sought flexibility rather than stability
in employment and the average length of job tenure began to drop as
the number of "contingent employees" who are leased or sub-
contracted reached new heights in the American economy. The new
horizontal organization of firms broke down the job ladders and
administrative rules of the internal labor market, and firms became
more market driven.'2 In the 1990s, the developed world experienced a
near doubling of the relevant labor force from 3.3 billion to 6 billion
with the collapse of communism, India's emergence from autarky, and
China's adoption of "mediated" market capitalism." Because all of
these countries are relatively capital poor, their entry into the global
economy has brought no corresponding increase in global capital, and as
a result, the capital-to-labor ratio in the global economy has dropped
approximately forty percent, putting tremendous downward pressure on
worker's wages and benefits world-wide.'
Finally, in 2008 the United States-and the rest of the world-found
itself in the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. As
previously discussed, the burst of a speculative bubble in the American
real estate market threatened the economic viability of mortgage
institutions, banks, and financial institutions that had heavily leveraged
their positions to invest in mortgage instruments1 " Credit markets
123. CAPPELLI, supra note 49, at 102-04.
124. Id. at 99-100.
125. Perhaps the most extreme example of these horizontal methods of production is the
Volkswagen truck plant in Resende, Brazil, where the employees of various subcontractors,
under one roof, assemble trucks made from parts from around the world, with only a handful
of actual Volkswagen employees on hand to perform quality control. Id. at 104.
126. FREEMAN, supra note 42, at 128-29.
127. Id. at 130.
12& See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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ground to a halt as financial institutions became afraid to loan money to
each other because of uncertainty about the borrower's exposure in
mortgage instruments. To avoid a collapse of the global financial
system, governments around the world intervened to prevent the failure
of financial institutions by buying the troubled mortgage instruments
and taking equity positions in troubled financial institutions. Although
it seems that these interventions have succeeded in preventing a global
economic depression, there seems little doubt that the stress on the
credit markets and the decline of the stock markets we have
experienced will result in a significant slowing in economic growth for
some time. Such a slowdown will undoubtedly have an impact on
employee's wages and benefits.
The new age of trade and technology that has developed since the
1970s has not been kind to American workers. At least since the 1980s,
real compensation received by American workers has remained fairly
flat, even though productivity has steadily risen. From 1979-2009, the
index of average real hourly compensation for American nonfarm
business workers rose from 206.12 to 281.62 (1947=100) or just 36.6%,
while the index of hourly productivity for those workers rose from
219.09 to 400.66 (1947=100) or 82.9%." This "wage gap" is shown in
Graph 1 below. The gap is even more striking if one examines only the
wages of non-supervisory workers whose average real hourly wages
increased from $18.64 to $19.01 (2009 dollars), or merely 2%, between
1979 and 2009.'" As shown in Graph 1, prior to 1980, the hourly
compensation of American workers largely kept pace with hourly
productivity increases during the post-wage period."' However, since
1980, the hourly compensation of American workers fell further and
further behind their productivity increase.
129. See infra tbl.1. Over the period 1970-2009, the index of hourly productivity for
American workers rose from 184.65 to 400.66 (1947=100) or 117% while their index of
average real hourly compensation rose from 182.69 to 281.62 (1947=100) or just 54.2%. See
MISHEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 58 fig.1G, 128 tbl.3.2.
130. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTIcS DATA SETS, http://www.bls.gov/lpc/#data,
http://www.bls.gov/data/; MISHEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 130.
131. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 130.
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Graph 1:Nonfarm Busleess Workers Wages and
Prodactivity, 1947 to2009
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Soura: Burcau of Labor Statistics Data Scts. http/www.b.aovlpd#data. httPwww.bi.haovAlata
The wealth generated by the increases in productivity since 1980 did
not just disappear, but instead became ever more concentrated in the
highest income earners, including, of course, corporate CEOs. From
1979 to 2007, the percent of total income going to the top 5% of income
earners increased from 15.5% to 20.1% and the ratio of their average
income to the average income of families in the bottom 20% of the
income distribution rose from 11.4 to 19.7.m-2 Similarly, between 1978
and 2006, average CEO pay increased from thirty-five times the average
worker's pay to 275 times the average worker's pay-- over $12 million
per year.3  As a result, the decline in the rewards to labor is even more
pronounced if one examines just non-supervisory salaries. In Graph 2, I
present a graph of the non-supervisory employee's share of nonfarm
domestic product over the years 1964 to 2009. As can be seen in Graph
2, there is a pronounced drop in the non-supervisor employees' share
beginning in about 1974.
132. Id. at 60-61. Of course wealth was even more concentrated. In the period from
1983 to 2004, the ratio of the average wealth of the 1% wealthiest people in the United States
rose from 131 times the median wealth of Americans to 190 times the median wealth of
Americans. Id. at 269 fig.5C.
133. Id. at 221 fig.3AE.
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Graph 2:NonSeporvisory Employee Sham of
Private Noafarm Domestic Product
45% --- - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - -- - -- - - - - -- -- - - - - -
40%.. . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . .
35%
30% -..
05%
Year
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Data. httpilvww.bis.govfipci#data. httpIfwww.btsgovidata
Economists have provided three interrelated explanations for this
increase in income inequality and the decline in "labor's share" of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in the U.S.m The first is that the
improvements in technology wrought by the new information
technology have improved capital's productivity and thus its earning
power-increasing capital's share of GDP. Second, globalization has
undermined the bargaining power of workers in developed countries,
particularly low-skill workers, as they have been thrown into
competition with low-wage workers across the globe. Finally, changes in
national product and labor market policies, for example decreases in the
134. "Labor's share" of GDP and the "wage gap" describe the same phenomenon.
labor's share a wages/GDP
= (wageslemployees)/(GDP/employees)
= average wagelproductivity - wage gap
MARIKA KARANASSOU & HECTOR SALA, THE WAGE-PRODUCrlVITY GAP REVISITED: IS
THE LABOUR SHARE NEUTRAL TO EMPLOYMENT? 6 (2010), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstracLid= 1651717.
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real minimum wage and declining support of public education and labor
unions, have undermined workers' bargaining power.' Although it is
difficult to determine how much each of these three factors has
contributed to the "wage gap" in the United States, Mishel, Bernstein,
and Allegretto have argued that a reasonable estimate is that each
factor is responsible for about a third of the currently observed gap."
The decline of labor's share and the growth of income among the
wealthiest Americans have led to growing inequality in the distribution
of income and wealth among Americans. There are a variety of
measures of income inequality in a country including the Gini
coefficient and the ratio of the income earned by the top 10% to the
income earned by the remainder of the population-all show significant
increases in inequality in recent years."' Economists Thomas Piketty
and Emmanuel Saez conducted a study of the growing income
inequality in the United States and produced a graph of the share on
national income earned by the top 10% of income earners that has
gotten a lot of attention and which is reproduced in Graph 3 below.'
Piketty and Saez' analysis shows that the share of national income
earned by the top 10% declined after World War II, during a period of
relative income equality which Piketty and Saez refer to as the "great
135. See Samuel Bentolila & Gilles Saint-Paul, Explaining Movements in the Labor
Share, 3 CONTRIB. MACROECONOMICS, Art. 9, at 1-31 (2003). See generally Benjamin
Bental & Dominique Demouguin, Declining Labor Shares and Bargaining Power: An
Institutional Explanation, 32 J. MACROECONOMICS 443 (2010).
136. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 7; William D. Ferguson, Explaining the Rising
Wage-Productivity Gap of the 1980s: Effects of Declining Employment and Unionization, 28
REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 77, 79 (1996) (holding that 18-43% of U.S. wage gap explained
by decline in unionization).
137. The Gini coefficient is defined based on the "Lorenz curve," which plots the
proportion of the total income of the population that is cumulatively earned by the bottom
x% of the population. The line at 45 degrees thus represents perfect equality of incomes.
The Gini coefficient is given by the ratio of the area that lies between the line of equality and
the Lorenz curve over the total area under the line of equality. The Gini coefficient can
range from 0 to 1 with a low Gini coefficient indicating a more equal distribution of income.
A Gini coeficient of 0 corresponds to complete equality, while Gini coefficient of 1
corresponds to complete inequality. After holding steady at about 0.4 during the post war
period, the Gini coefficient for the U.S. increased from 0.403 to 0.468 over the period 1980 to
2009. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES-HOUSEHOLDS,
GINI RATIOS FOR HOUSEHOLDS BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN OF HOUSEHOLDER,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/index.html (last visited
Mar. 25,2011). In 2005, the Gini index for the EU was estimated at 0.31. EUROFOUND, GINI
INDEX (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/qualityoflife/eurlifelindex.
php?template=3&radioindic=158&idDomain=3.
138. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-
1998, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1, 7-11 (2003).
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compression," but that since 1980 the share of national income earned
by the top 10% has increased to levels not seen since the Great
Depression, a phenomenon Piketty and Saez refer to as the "great
divergence." The increasing inequality in the distribution of income and
wealth in the American economy is a matter of some concern. Not only
does it undermine our democratic institutions and the American ideal of
equal opportunity, but some economists have suggested that the
growing income inequality is a drag on the economy itself because high
income earners spend a lower share of their increased incomes,
decreasing aggregate demand."
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Piketty eds.. Oxford University Press. 2007). Data Downloaded from: http'lwww.econ.
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139. RAVEENDRA BATRA, THE GREAT DEPRESSION OF 1990, at 118-19 (1987); Robert
B. Reich, How to End the Great Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010, at A21. This debate
goes back to the Great Depression when FDR's Federal Reserve Chairman Martin Eccles
maintained that income inequality was a major cause of the Great Depression. Steve Christ,
The Great Deperession's Ben Bernanke, WEALTH DAILY, Apr. 20, 2009,
http://www.wealthdaily.com/articles/great-depression-ben+bernanke/1785 (citing MARRINER
S. ECCLES, BECKONING FRONTIERS (1951); Robert Reich, The Earthquake Economy, The
Economist, Sept. 9,2010, http://ideas.economist.com/blog/earthquake-economy.
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Moreover while compensation has remained largely stagnant for
American workers over the last three decades, their uncertainty and risk
have increased in the new economic environment. In the new age of
trade and information technology, as corporations have reorganized
themselves horizontally across the globe using outsourcing, sub-
contracting, and investment abroad, they have increasingly jettisoned
long-term employment relationships and the attendant administrative
rules and long-term benefits that the corporations used to promote such
relationships. The simplest measure of increased job insecurity is the
average length of current job tenure. Turnover rates and job tenure
varies by age, gender, and education. However, looking at all age,
gender, and education groups, for workers 35-54 years of age, all
demographic groups suffered decreases in the length of job tenure
between 2000-2006, and all groups, except women, suffered decreases in
the length of job tenure between 1973-2000.140 Older men and the less
educated suffered the largest drops in job tenure over this period,
ranging from twenty-five months for men 45-54 years old and nineteen
months for workers with a high school degree or less to the loss of only a
month in average job tenure for the young and college educated.
The security of employer-provided employee benefit plans has also
declined in the last three decades. In 2007, there were 2.7 million fewer
Americans covered by employer-provided health insurance than in
2000, and the percent of the non-elderly population covered by such
health insurance had dropped from 68.3% in 2000 to 62.9% in 2007.42
This loss of health insurance was felt most by the low-skilled, low-wage
workers. Similarly the percent of private sector workers who are
covered by an employer-provided pension has decreased from 50.6% in
1979 to 42.8% in 2006." Moreover, beginning in about 1980, American
employers began to abandon defined benefit pension plans in favor of
defined contribution pension plans, shifting the risk of investment loss
and gain and actuarial miscalculation to the employee. As a result,
while in 1980 roughly three-fifths of employer-provided pension plans
were defined-benefit plans, by 2004 slightly less than a quarter of such
plans were defined-benefit plans.'"
140. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 259 tbl.4.9.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 336.
143. Id. at 150, tbl.3.13.
144. Samuel Estreicher & Laurence Gold, The Shift from Defined Benefit Plans to
Defined Contribution Plans, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 331, 331-32 (2007); James Poterba
et al., The Changing Landscape of Pensions in the United States (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
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In order to maintain their living standards, cover losses from
unemployment and illness, and provide their children with educational
opportunities to compete with the higher classes, American middle-class
workers have taken on increasing levels of debt. Since 1979, total
household debt has grown from 13.8% of all assets and 73.5% of
disposable income to 19.9% of all assets and 141.3% of disposable
income. 45 The costs of debt as a percent of disposable income are
growing the fastest for the middle class and the near-rich, and slowest
for the rich. In 2004, the middle and fourth quintiles on the income
distribution were spending an average of 19% of their disposable
income on debt service, while the richest decile was spending just
9.3%.'4 This desire to borrow fed into the mortgage financing crisis as
many middle income Americans borrowed against the inflated prices of
their houses to consume. Minimum asset and liquidity requirements
prevent poorer workers from borrowing money.
So far, the new age of trade and technology has proven an
inhospitable environment for American workers to pursue their
interests through individual bargaining. The decline of the American
labor movement, deregulation, and low-wage competition from abroad
have combined to lower workers' bargaining power in a system of
individual bargaining in which employers have many advantages. As a
result, real wages have remained stagnant for decades and workers have
been asked to accept greater risk in uncertainty over job security and
the provision of employee benefits. American workers are finding it
necessary to work longer hours and borrow more money just to
maintain their standard of living and compete with the upper class for
education and opportunities. As characterized by Professor Bagchi
during the symposium, America seems to be developing a "niche" in the
world economy for providing "flexible labor" that is willing to work long
hours at modest wages. That may sound good from management's
perspective, but is there a way we could evolve to a "niche" in which we
did a better job of meeting workers' needs?
Research, Working Paper No. 13,381, 2007).
145. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 284 tbl.5.12.
146. Id. at 288 tbl.5.14.
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IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF PRODUCTION:
PROMOTING EMPLOYEE VOICE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND LABOR RELATIONS
Of course, the problems of promoting employee voice in corporate
governance and labor relations are interrelated.147 At least in the United
States, labor relations is the primary forum through which employees
can impact corporate performance and governance. Moreover, in other
countries where employees have greater opportunities to affect
corporate governance through other channels, these actions inevitably
affect labor relations. For the time being however, I will continue to
treat these problems separately. My primary argument is that, at least in
the United States, we need to promote employee voice in both
corporate governance and labor relations.
A. The Benefits of Employees as Active Participants in
Corporate Governance
The perpetual alliance of management and shareholder interests in
the American system of corporate governance leaves shareholders
without an important in-house ally in the monitoring of management
performance and management without an important long-term ally in
considering the merit of long-term strategies and investments. The
three primary stakeholders in corporate governance are management,
capital, and labor. They vary in interests, advantages, and liabilities,
creating the problem of how best to govern the modern corporation.
Management has important informational advantages over shareholders
because members of management are "insiders" with important
information on the day-to-day running of the firm. These informational
advantages are why shareholders hire management to run their
businesses and make day-to-day operational decisions. However, by
hiring separate management, the shareholders create the inevitable
agency problem in that management will have personal interests apart
from shareholders and the long-run interests of the firm, and thus must
be monitored to make sure they act in the best interests of the firm.
Like management, labor also has important informational advantages
over the shareholders because they are in the plant and involved in the
day-to-day operation of the plant." Like the shareholders, labor also
has an interest in monitoring management because of their investments
147. Gospel & Pendleton, supra note 26, at 2.
148. Bodie, supra note 8, at 899, 900; Greenfield, supra note 8, at 301.
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in firm-specific human capital and pensions that are tied to the long-run
future of the firm. Indeed, in the modern age of mobile management
and capital, it appears that labor is emerging as the stakeholder with the
greatest personal interest in the long-run operation of the firm. Also,
like management, labor has important personal interests in the running
of the firm that may diverge from those of management and the
shareholders. Although management, capital, and labor have a
collective interest in the success of the firm, they have individual
interests in how the proceeds of that success are divided.' 49
As described by Jackson, Hopner, and Kurdelbusch," there are
three possible alliances among the three primary stakeholders in
corporate governance, each of which can be very useful. In the first and
almost universal state of affairs in the United States, management and
capital form a "Class Conflict" alliance to monitor labor."' This alliance
is taken to an extreme in the shareholder value system of corporate
governance because management interests are consciously allied with at
least the short-term shareholder interests through management bonus
plans and stock options, and labor is treated primarily as a commodity
to be purchased or discarded. The problem with relying solely on this
alliance scheme to govern a corporation is that management gives up an
important ally with insider information and a long-run interest in the
running of the firm in trying to convince shareholders to make
investments and do things that insure long-run profitability, and the
shareholders give up the same important ally with insider information
and a long-run interest in the running of the firm in trying to monitor
management. A purported benefit of the American system of relying so
heavily on a Class Conflict alliance in corporate governance is flexibility
and innovation in responding to changes in the economic environment
and technology. However, as previously mentioned,"2 this flexibility
comes at the expense of employees and long-term investments in human
capital and relationships." Moreover, as we have seen in the recent
economic downturn, flexibility has a negative side-lack of stability.
In the second form of alliance, management and labor form an
"Insider-Outsider" alliance to use their information on the running of
the firm and the firm's long-run interests to convince shareholders to
149. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 75, at 446-47.
150. Jackson et al., supra note 7, at 95.
151. Id. at 96-97.
152. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
153. O'Connor, supra note 33, at 904-07.
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undertake investments in capital, training, and relationships that may
decrease short-run profits but improve the firm's long-run prospects.'
The relative lack of the appearance of this alliance in American
corporate governance is a primary source of the inordinate focus on
short-term profits by American corporations. In its fully developed
form, this alliance might be described as a partnership between labor
and management who then enter the capital market to buy capital as a
commodity. There are some real advantages for society when labor and
management form an Insider-Outsider alliance to run a corporation.
First, under such alliances labor and management enter the market to
buy capital as a commodity, leaving returns to capital-rather than
labor-to suffer the ups and downs of financial fluctuations."' Ceteris
paribus capitalists are probably in a better position to suffer this risk
than workers because they can more easily diversify their investment
across multiple firms and industries and because they suffer fewer
transaction costs from temporary setbacks. Second, it is probably not a
coincidence that countries focusing on corporate governance through
labor management alliances enjoy much lower levels of industrial strife
in their labor relations. It seems that partnerships in corporate
governance lead to partnerships in labor relations.
Finally, the third possible alliance that might be formed in corporate
governance is an "Accountability Conflict" alliance between capital and
labor in monitoring management.' This alliance is useful because
shareholders have important mechanisms to exercise control over
management, while labor has useful insider information in the running
of the firm, and both of these parties have an interest in checking
management excesses.'" The relative lack of the appearance of this
alliance in American corporate governance is an important cause of our
problem with excessive management compensation, along with lack of
effective monitoring by shareholders. Inadequate monitoring of
154. Jackson et al., supra note 7, at 97-98.
155. Id. at 98.
156. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Labor Law and Industrial Peace: A Comparative
Analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan Under the Bargaining
Model, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 117 (2000).
157. Jackson et al., supra note 7, at 98-99.
15& See Peter Kuhn, Malfeasance in Long Term Employment Contracts: A New
General Model with an Application to Unionism 28-29 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 1045, 1982) [hereinafter Kuhn, Malfeasance]; see also Bodie, supra note 8,
at 899-900; Greenfield, supra note 8, at 301; Peter Kuhn, Union Productivity Effects and
Economic Efficiency, 6 J. LAB. REs. 229, 230 (1985) [hereinafter Kuhn, Union Productivity];
Reberioux, supra note 8, at 508.
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management is a particular problem in the American system of
corporate governance because in the United States, managers typically
nominate the Board of Directors that monitors them on the
shareholders' behalf and for most major corporations, stock ownership
is dispersed and ephemeral. Given these disadvantages, it would be
particularly useful to American shareholders to have access to
employees inside allies.
I I Figure :ThreeTypesodPartialCoalitioninCorporateGvernance
(a) Class Conflict (b) Insider-Outsider
(c) Accountability Conflict
Source: GregaryJacksan.Martin Hapner. and Antie Kurdelbusch.Carporate Governance and
EmployeesinGermany:Changing Unkages.Conplementarities, andTensions (January 2004)
(availalde at http i/paperssronomfsd3lpaperscfm?abtractid=503062).
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B. The Benefits of Employees as Active Participants in Labor Relations
By facilitating a greater role for employee collective voice in
American labor relations, we also might hope to address some of the
short-comings of the system of individual bargaining. The proponents
of the NLRA argued that fostering unionization would allow employees
to gain a greater share of the proceeds of their labor and achieve some
level of "industrial democracy" in the workplace, and in our larger
society.'59 Promoting employee organization was seen as a redistributive
policy in which employees would gain at the expense of their employers,
hopefully stimulating consumer demand to help ease the ravages of the
depression.o The organization of workers in unions was also viewed as
beneficial because it would give them a greater say in the running of the
workplace, and perhaps the country. The analogy was made that if
democracy was the most beneficial and fair way of running the
government, then "industrial democracy" was necessary for the
advantageous and fair running of the workplace."' Although these
arguments find no support in the neoclassical economic analysis, they
find support in economic arguments that accept the imperfections of the
labor market.
Employee voice can help address labor market failures due to
imperfect information, transaction costs, and public goods. Any
effective form of employee voice in labor relations will facilitate the
exchange of information between management and the employees and
help to minimize these problems-an independent union that can
provide protection from retaliation and an efficient means for enforcing
labor management agreements can address them all the better.1 62
Effective communication between labor and management would
facilitate the exchange of information that is available to the parties, for
example on job risks and how to deal with them. An independent union
might even retain trained professionals in occupational safety and health
and generate their own information on how best to deal with these risks
that can then be shared with management." Employee representation
159. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
160. MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 46.
161. Id.
162. See JOHN F. WITE, DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITY, AND ALIENATION IN WORK 90-
91 (1980); cf FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10, at 8-9 (noting the difficulties faced by a
worker without an independent union to back her up in addressing these problems).
163. Most international unions retain such experts, but especially those where such
information is paramount to their members, for example the Chemical Workers. History of
the ICWUC, http://www.icwuc.org/history.html (last visited Mar. 25,2011).
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in discussions with management can also lower transaction costs and
help hold management to the equitable treatment of workers under
long-term implicit deals. It would be harder for employers to renege on
promises of employment security or pensions if there were employee
representatives or an independent union that could call the management
on such opportunism.'6 Finally, employee voice will help solve the
problem of negotiating public goods in the work place. Once again an
independent union that can protect against retaliation and enforce
agreements is best, but even representative employee committees can
provide management with useful information on employee interests in
public goods such as the speed of the assembly-line or the level of air
quality or light in the workplace.65
Moreover, there are a variety of theories suggesting that "industrial
democracy," or giving workers a say in the workplace, can be
productivity enhancing. Workers' long production hours often result in
ideas as to how productivity can be enhanced. If employees are allowed
to engage management on an equal basis concerning the methods of
production, they can often contribute useful insights. Moreover,
workers have an interest in the productivity of their firm, and, if
protected from arbitrary discharge by a union, can act as a more
effective monitor of management waste than absent shareholders. Some
have argued that the mere appearance of a union in the workplace can
"shock" management out of lethargy and on to greater productivity."
Finally, employee voice can raise productivity in the workplace by
promoting the efficient expression rather than the costly "exit" of
individual workers dissatisfied with their job.' In a competitive labor
market, the primary mechanism for expressing dissatisfaction with
working conditions is for the worker to take another job or "exit."
164. Kuhn, Malfeasance, supra note 158, at 28-29; see also Kuhn, Union Productivity,
supra note 158, at 230; James M. Malcomson, Trade Unions and Economic Efficiency, 93
ECON. J. 51, 52 (1983). See generally M.W. Reder, Unionism, Wages, and Contract
Enforcement, in RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS: NEW APPROACHES TO LABOR UNIONS
27,27 (Joseph D. Reid, Jr. ed., Supp. II 1983).
165. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10, at 14-16; Freeman & Medoff, supra note 10,
at 70-71. For some interesting applications of this argument to labor law, see Keith N. Hylton
& Maria O'Brien Hylton, Rational Decisions and Regulation of Union Entry, 34 VILL. L.
REV. 145, 152 (1989).
166. BARRY T. HIRSCH & JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS:
NEW APPROACHES AND EVIDENCE 188 (1986); Matthew S. Goldberg, Discrimination,
Nepotism, and Long-Run Wage Differentials, 97 Q.J. ECON. 307 (1982).
167. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10, at 14-16; Freeman & Medoff, supra note 10,
at 71.
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However, exit is less efficient than "voice" in encouraging changes in
working conditions because exit communicates little and results in
relocation and retraining costs. Convincing empirical evidence exists
that some industries enjoy significant productivity increases from
unionism. For example, Kim Clark compared the physical output of
cement plants before and after organization, and between different
organized and unorganized plants, and found statistically significant
productivity increases from unionization that ranged from 6-10%.*6
Effective employee voice can also address the inequity in bargaining
power between employers and employees-at least where there is an
independent union. Collective bargaining is the only way for employees
to gain a share of the product market rents or Ricardian rents that their
labor produces." Wage increases from these sources are largely
redistributive, with minimal impact on efficiency."' Although labor
cartels like those envisioned in the neoclassical analysis undoubtedly
exist in the American economy, the empirical evidence suggests that
labor cartel power is less important than these other sources of union
wage increases. Few product markets approach a percent of workers
organized that might even be imagined a labor cartel.'72 Moreover, the
best available evidence suggests that union wage increases come largely
at the expense of employers and are strongly associated with the market
168. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10, at 170-71; HIRSH & ADDISON, supra note
166, at 195. But see John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity,
Profits, and Growth: Has the Long Run Arrived?, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 72, 100 (1989) (concluding
that productivity effect of unions has not yet been proved); Peter J. Turnbull, Trade Unions
and Productivity: Opening the Harvard "Black Boxes," 12 J. LAB. RES. 135, 148 (1991).
169. Kim B. Clark, The Impact of Unionization on Productivity: A Case Study, 33 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REv. 451, 467 (1980); Kim B. Clark, Unionization and Productivity: Micro-
Econoetric Evidence, 95 O.J. ECON. 613, 638 (1980).
170. Product market rents are those rents that the firm earns because its product market
is not fully competitive and the firm enjoys some pricing power in the product market.
Ricardian rents are those returns the firm earns because either the firm or the workers enjoy
some unusually productive resource such as a particularly rich vein of coal close to the surface
or an athlete like Michael Jordan. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 75, at 429.
171. Although this assertion can be demonstrated more generally, it is perhaps easiest to
see when considering contract negotiations between a union and an employer with rents from
a product market monopoly. Assuming that, prior to the organization of the union, the
employer was optimally mixing capital and labor in production and optimally pricing his
product in order to maximize the value of his monopoly rent, when the employees form a
union and demand a share of that rent, any inefficient substitution of capital for labor and any
change in product price will serve only to decrease the total size of the rent to be divided
between the employer and the employees. Assuming the employer and the union negotiate
to maximize the monetary value of their agreement, they will negotiate to increase wages but
maintain employment at the current level. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 75, at 424.
172. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 75, at 471.
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power of the employing firm."
Promoting employee voice also treats workers more as humans than
a commodity, giving them a larger say in the rules that organize our
society. Employee voice and organization turns employees from "one-
shoters" into "repeat players" in the litigation of legal rules, the
development of statutory law and the development of norms in
society."' In the lexicon of the law and society literature, employee
voice and organization turns employees from "have-nots" into "haves"
in the legal and social discourse.17' Although individual employees have
no interest in legal precedent, leaving the common law to evolve in
employer's favor, when they bind together into unions they have
incentive to pursue efficient legal rules." For example, in litigation
against individual employees, employers managed to convince courts
that promises of "permanent employment" actually meant that the
employee could be discharged at any time, for any reason.1" This would
not seem to be the efficient default for interpreting this language since it
is contrary to common usage and employees would have to retain a
lawyer in order to know to contract around this result. Job security
provisions in collective bargaining agreements enforced by unions are
not interpreted so perversely. 78
173. HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 166, at 211-14; Kim B. Clark, Unionization and
Firm Performance: The Impact on Profits, Growth and Productivity, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 893,
918 (1984) (using accounting data on over 900 product-line businesses to conclude that
unionization substantially decreased profits but had little effect on price, output, or capital-to-
labor mix); Paula B. Voos & Lawrence R. Mishel, The Union Impact on Profits: Evidence
from Industry Price-Cost Margin Data, 4 J. LAB. ECON. 105, 107 (1986) (using price-cost
margin data on 139 industries over the years 1968-1970 to estimate that on average 80% of
union wage and benefit increases was paid out of company profits and only 20% was paid out
of price increases to consumers). See generally Richard B. Freeman, Unionism, Price-Cost
Margins, and the Return to Capital (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 1164, 1983)
174. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 68, at 207.
175. Galanter, supra note 67, at 103-04.
176. Paul Rubin has established that " repeat players" to a legal controversy, such as
manufacturers, banks, and employers, who have an interest in precedent, will continue to
litigate a dispute with each new "one-shoter," individual consumers or employees, until a
court rules in his favor and precedent favors his position. This is true even though the
resulting legal rule may be inefficient. Thus, one can reasonably expect that the law will tend
to evolve in favor of repeat players at the expense of one-shoters regardless of the efficiency
or equity of the resulting legal rule. However, when both sides to a dispute are repeat-players
and have an interest in precedent, only inefficient rules will be litigated and the court
interpretations of the law will evolve towards efficiency. Rubin, supra note 67, at 51-63.
177. See, e.g., Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 266 N.W. 872, 873-74 (Minn. 1936).
178. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 651-55 (4th
ed. 1985).
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Similar arguments concerning the benefits of employee voice and
organization in the drafting and enforcement of labor and employment
laws can be made on the basis of public choice theory." Public choice
theory posits that, because there are time and information costs to
evaluating and opposing or supporting legislation, small organized
groups in which individual members enjoy high benefits from a certain
legislative position will gain in the legislative process at the expense of
large disorganized groups in which the cost of the legislative proposal
are broadly dispersed. Even if the general citizenry rise up and demand
a legislative position contrary to the interests of the small organized
interest group, the interest group will have advantages in influencing the
administration of the law. Employers, and especially large corporations,
have long been well organized and effective lobbyists. Their
hierarchical command structure, access to resources, and organization
by industry, state, and nation, have long allowed them to pursue their
interests in the legislative and administrative arenas at the expense of
less organized and more dispersed groups and the public at large. To
the extent that employee voice and organization allows employees to
effectively express their views on legislation and enforcement, it can
allow employees to act as a counter-balance to employer views resulting
in more efficient and equitable legislation. For example, prior to the
turn of the twentieth century the common law defenses of "assumption
of risk," "contributory negligence," and the "fellow servant rule" largely
prevented employees injured on the job from collecting from their
employers which, combined with inadequate compensating wages,
resulted in employers having too little incentive to take safety
precautions." Unions countered employer interests by lobbying for the
statutory repeal of the common law defenses, and then settling for
workers' compensation statutes-a much more efficient and equitable
result than the old common law. The drafters of the NLRA endorsed
the idea that, because capital was already organized, it was only fair to
encourage labor to organize in order to provide industrial and political
symmetry.18 1
Finally, employee voice can help promote social norms that benefit
employees and society as a whole. Norms are informal standards for
179. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI.
335, 335-58 (1974); Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REV. 191, 191-98 (1988).
180. KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYEE 653, 662-64 (4th ed. 2011).
181. GROSS, supra note 45, at 16.
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behavior that are widely held among the relevant population and
enforced by the populations' approval or disapproval. Since people are
social animals, people's behavior is influenced by norms as well as laws.
Indeed, it is possible to think of the legal system as a formal subset of
the system of norms. Laws and norms are endogenously determined in
that practices that are required by law can become routine or custom
and accordingly develop into a norm, and important norms that are
broadly held by a population have a high probability of being formalized
into law. Economists have hypothesized that society will tend to
develop useful or efficient norms as groups of people who hold these
norms succeed at the expense of people who do not." This evolutionary
theory of norms has been used to explain the development of norms for
cooperation, altruism, and "fair treatment."' Analogizing from the
arguments on the evolution efficient case law and legislation, it seems
quite plausible that vocal and organized groups have advantages in the
development of social norms. Organized groups can better lobby the
beliefs of the population at large and have advantages in litigation and
legislation, which also in turn may establish norms. To the extent that
employee interests differ from employer interests, organized employees
can act as an effective counterweight to organized employer interests
and facilitate the production of more efficient and equitable norms. As
with litigation, legislation and administration, organized groups have an
advantage in the formulation of social norms. Examples of norms that
organized labor has influenced to society's benefit through social
advocacy and legislation include the norm against child labor, the norm
in favor of the forty-hour work week, and the increasing value placed on
worker health and safety by society at large.
C. Comparative Examples of Employee Voice in
Corporate Governance and Labor Relations
Americans are generally so used to thinking of labor as the
subordinate odd-man out in the running of the firm that it is hard for
them to conceive of alliances between labor and management or labor
and capital to check the excesses of the third party, but in fact such
alliances are common, even the norm, in other industrialized countries.
In the European political economy literature, Hall and Soskice have
182. Kaushik Basu, Notes on Evolution, Rationality and Norms, 152 J. INST.
THEORETICAL ECON. 739,745-47 (1996).
183. Werner Gith & Reinhard Tietz, Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and
Comparison of Experimental Results, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 417 (1990).
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distinguished between "liberal market" economies, usually represented
by the United States and Great Britain, and "coordinated market"
economies, for example Germany and Japan, in considering
international differences in corporate finance, governance and labor
relations." Liberal market economies use predominantly a class-
conflict alliance between capital and management to conduct corporate
governance, with labor left to absorb financial stresses through cuts in
wages, benefits, and job tenure. In contrast, in coordinated market
economies the parties undertake alliances that involve labor to conduct
corporate governance, and financial fluctuations are more likely to be
absorbed by shareholders than labor.'8 Both systems are market
disciplined, the question is whether labor or capital are bought and sold
as a commodity and subject to the brunt of economic fluctuations. A
similar distinction has been made in the financial economics literature
between "market/outsider" finance and governance systems (the United
States and Great Britain) and "relational/insider" finance and
governance systems (Germany and Japan)." Analogous distinctions
have been made in the Japanese academic literature for years and are
perhaps most closely associated with the work of Takashi Araki.'8
Similarly, Americans are so used to thinking of employees as
subordinate in labor relations, largely left to accept the employer's offer
or else search for another job, that it is hard for them to imagine how
active employee voice could work to both side's benefit, but in fact in
perhaps every other industrialized democracy in the world labor
undertakes a more active role in the determination of their wages and
working conditions. The examples of Germany and Japan are once
again instructive. In Germany, workers enjoy a legally mandated system
of "codetermination" in which every employer with more than five
employees is required to have a Works Council of elected employee
184. Hall & Soskice, supra note 31, at 16.
185. Gospel & Pendleton, supra note 26, at 8.
186. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
3-24 (2000); Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K.,
Germany, and France, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 281, 283-88 (Donald H. Chew ed., 1997); Colin Mayer, Financial
Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development, in ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION,
CORPORATE FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 307,307-08 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1990).
187. See, e.g., Takashi Araki, Corporate Governance and Employment and Labour
Relations in Japan, the US and Germany, in GENDAi NIHON NO KOPORETO GABANANSU
(CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN) (Takeshi Inagami ed., 2000); see
also Takashi Araki, A Comparative Analysis: Corporate Governance and Labor and
Employment Relations in Japan, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 67 (2000).
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representatives that is consulted on a broad array of issues concerning
the running of the workplace."' A somewhat modified form of the
German Works Council system is becoming the norm for labor relations
across the European Union.'" The combination of Works Councils, a
much higher level of union organization, and national tri-partite
bargaining over working conditions and public policy, ensure that
German workers have a real say in the running of their workplace. In
Japan, the workers engage in a "community of shared fate" with
management that is established and governed largely through traditional
business practices rather than law.'" Because of Japan's employee-
centered corporate culture, the common Japanese practice of promoting
managers and directors from employee ranks, and Japan's higher levels
of union organization, Japanese workers can be sure that their interests
will be represented in the firm's labor relations policies.9 1
1. The German System of Codetermination
Although it has roots in Catholic social theory and the 1920 Works
Councils Act, the modern German system of codetermination, or
Mitbestimmung, was developed shortly after World War II, beginning
first in the coal and steel industries and then expanding to the economy
as a whole.'" The basic idea is that workers have a right to participate in
the management of the corporation and that such participation benefits
workers, the firm and society as a whole.'" The system of
188. MANFRED WEISS, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GERMANY 169
(1995); see Richard B. Freeman & Edward P. Lazear, An Economic Analysis of Works
Councils, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 27,27-52 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995).
189. The idea of co-determination is prominent in a number of European Union
directives. Council Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the European company Statute
prescribes employee involvement in European companies (Societas Europea) in the form of
information and consultation of employees and, in some cases, board-level participation.
Council Directive 2001/86/EC, art. 4, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 22, 26 (EU). Similarly, Council
Directive 2002/14/EC establishes a framework for information and consultation with
employees in the European Community. Council Directive 2002/141EC, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29
(EU).
190. Yasuo Kuwahara, Employment Relations in Japan, in INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 249,257 (Greg J. Bamber & Russell D. Lansbury
eds., 1998).
191. Id. at 259-60.
192. WEISS, supra note 188, at 169.
193. Friedrich Forstenberg, Employment Relations in Germany, in INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS, supra note 190, at 201, 211-12; Johannes
Schregle, Co-Determination in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Comparative View, 117
INT'L LAB. REV. 81, 82-83 (1978).
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codetermination was enacted into German law through a series of
statutes including the Co-operative Management Law of 1951 (amended
in 1976), the Workers Committee Law of 1952 (amended in 1972), and
the One-Third Participation Act of 2004.'94 Under these laws, every
workplace with more than five employees is required to have a Works
Council of elected employee representatives.' The management of the
firm is required to provide information to the Works Council and
consult with the Works Council on a broad array of non-wage subjects
from break time to safety.'" In addition, the Works Council selects
employee representatives to serve on the company's Supervisory Board,
which is akin to the board of directors for an American corporation and
monitors management in coordination with the Shareholder's Board.
Under German law, for companies with more than 500 employees, one-
third of the Supervisory Board members must be employee
representatives, and for coal and steel companies with more than 100
employees and other companies with more than 2,000 employees, half of
the Supervisory Board members must be employee representatives,
subject to a Chairman selected by the shareholders." The combination
of the Works Councils and employee representatives on the governing
boards of German corporations ensures that workers have at least some
input into every corporate decision and have ready access to virtually all
information concerning their employer. When the employee
representatives on the Works Council and Supervisory Board are
supported by an independent labor union, which is common in
Germany, the employees can have a real say in the governance of the
firm.'"
The German system of Codetermination helps to alleviate some of
the problems in corporate governance that we suffer under the
American system of an exclusive management-capital alliance focused
194. Marc Goergen et al., Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance, 28
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 175 (2008); Thomas Wagerich, BUSINEss LAWS OF GERMANY § 1:95
(2010).
195. WEISS, supra note 188, at 169; Furstenberg, supra note 194, at 211; Schregle, supra
note 193, at 82-83.
196. FOrstenberg, supra note 193, at 211.
197. See WEISS, supra note 188, at 190; Schregle, supra note 193, at 82-83; see also
Ffilrstenberg, supra note 193, at 212-13.
198, The German system of Codetermination in corporate governance also enjoys
widespread social and political support among the German people which helps to ensure its
effectiveness. Harold Meyerson, How Germany Got It Right on the Economy, WASH. POST,
Nov. 24, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/23/AR201011
2306280.html?referrer=emailarticle.
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on short-term share value. Direct representation of both labor and
financiers in the governance of the firm provides a more balanced
perspective between these interests. Because German companies are
less focused on short-term share value, they are open to a larger array of
rational business strategies,'9 for example pursuing higher market share
through a strategy of forward-pricing or entering market segments that
have lower returns but large market size and relatively low risk.m They
also are more willing to accept lower short-run returns in order to make
investments in capital improvements and research and development that
yield long-run benefits." Moreover, because they feel less urgency to
maximize short-run profits, they have a greater ability to absorb
fluctuations in raw material prices and are less likely to resort to lay-offs
in economic downturns-preserving employee morale and firm-specific
human capital.' German management is more closely scrutinized by
share-holders and labor than American management and has not
undertaken the abusive management compensation schemes seen in the
United States. According to Towers Perrin's 2006 survey, for industrial
companies with over $500 million in sales, American CEOs garnered an
average annual total compensation of $2.16 million, 62% of which was
incentive pay, while German CEOs were paid on average $1.18 million
for the year, with onlyl8.5% of that comprising incentive pay.
Empirical evidence suggests that German firms have higher productivity
and lower turnover costs,' while German workers enjoy more job
stability, greater opportunities for job training, and higher wages than
199. Jackson et at., supra note 7, at 97. They are also aided in this effort by enjoying
what has been called "patient capital." Ownership is much more concentrated in the German
economy than in the American economy, and there is much less threat of hostile takeovers
for corporate control. As a result, German owners are more to enjoy the benefits of long run
investments and be open to such strategies. Jackson et al., supra note 7, at 87-89. Bernd
Frick & Erik Lehmann, Corporate Governance in Germany: Ownership, Codetermination,
and Firm Performance in a Stakeholder Economy, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note
7, at 122, 124.
200. Cf WOLFGANG STREECK, SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN ADVANCED CAPITALIST
ECONOMIES 1-40 (1992).
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. Randall S. Thomas, International Executive Pay: Current Practices and Future
Trends, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, supra note 78, at 183, 187-89. The Germans' higher
concentration of corporate ownership probably also helps in this regard since shareholders
are more likely to pose an organized and powerful block in dealing with management.
Jackson et al., supra note 7, at 87.
204. Frick & Lehman, supra note 199, at 134, 137.
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their American counterparts.o
As with German corporate governance, German labor relations are
dominated by the system of co-determination. The idea of co-
determination is that both capital and labor should have a say in the
running of the firm and the division of the proceeds from the enterprise,
and that such a partnership will encourage cooperation and the
avoidance of labor disputes. Although Works Councils are prohibited
from undertaking work stoppages, their role in sharing information and
consulting with management on a large array of workplace issues
ensures that German employees have ready access to important
information concerning their employer and a real say in firm labor
relations policies. Of course, German workers are also free to associate
in independent unions that can undertake work stoppages and are
protected from employer discrimination in exercising this right of
association. Currently in Germany, about 19% of all workers are
represented by unions, while the corresponding number in the United
States is 11.9%.20 The combination of an employee Works Council with
employee representatives on the Board of Supervisors and an
independent union provides the employees with even more input into
the running of their firm. Although enactment of the Codetermination
Acts did not seem to have a significant impact on the profits of German
firms,' cross-sectional studies suggest Works Councils have a negative
impact on firm profits, but not rates of investment or innovation.'
Apparently, Works Councils lower the rate of return on capital, but
lower the risk of return sufficiently to make up for this drawback. There
seems little doubt that the German system of codetermination enjoys
significant advantages in promoting labor management cooperation and
industrial peace. The number of work days lost to industrial strife per
organized worker in Germany is about one-fifth the number of such
days lost in the United States.2"
205. Id. at 138 (discussing wages and benefits); Jackson et al., supra note 7, at 90-91
(discussing job tenure, turnover, and training).
206. ALFS Summary Tables, OECD.ORG, Mar. 27, 2011, http://stats.oecd.org/
Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ALFS_SUMTAB. Union density in the U.S. private sector is
currently less than 8%. Id.
207. Frick & Lehman, supra note 199, at 133.
208. Id. at 134; Gospel & Pendleton, supra note 26, at 24.
209. Over the period 1978-94, the average number work days lost to strikes and lockouts
per year per thousands organized workers in the United States was 110 while in Germany the
number was 22. In Japan the number average number of work days lost was only 13. Dau-
Schmidt, supra note 156, at 132 tbl.1.
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2. The Japanese System: "A Community of Shared Fate"
The modern Japanese system of industrial relations has its origins in
the aftermath of World War II. When the Allied Occupation ordered a
rapid expansion of private collective bargaining, Japanese executives
moved quickly to comply by encouraging their employees to join labor
unions.210 Thus, in Japan, labor unions were born not from virulent class
struggles, but from the initiative of company executives. These
corporate executives encouraged white-collar workers, as well as blue-
collar workers, to join unions in order to moderate union demands.21'
Furthermore, since companies in postwar Japan were mostly formed by
managers rather than independent owners, workers have no wealthy
propertied class above them, but only a managerial class whose lifestyle
is not very different from their own.212 Indeed, most Japanese managers
today, including most members of corporate boards of directors, were
promoted from within the company and many were former union
members.213
The Japanese have developed an "employee centered" system of
corporate governance,24 but this focus on employee interests arises
more from Japanese social norms and corporate practices than law.2 '1 In
practice, Japan's larger corporations treat the firm's employees as the
most important stake-holder." The rationale for this treatment is that
the Japanese view the employees as the stake-holder with the greatest
long-term interest in the firm and the stake-holder that makes the
largest contribution to and accepts the largest risk in the success of the
firm.217 It is considered dishonorable in Japan for a corporate manager
to make decisions that opportunistically sacrifice employee interests for
the benefit of share-holders.218 There is a strong social norm against
210. EZRA F. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA 159 (1979).
211. Id. at 153.
212. Id. at 154.
213. Kuwahara, supra note 190, at 257-59.
214. Itami even refers to the notion of the "employee-sovereign corporation" in Japan.
Hiroyuki Itami, Jinpon Shugi Kigyo (Employee-Centered Corporation) (1987); Hiroyuki
Itami, Nihon-Gata Koporeto Gabanansu (Japanese-Style Corporate Governance) (2000).
215. Takashi Araki, Corporate Governance, Labour, and Employment Relations in
Japan: The Future of the Stakeholder Model?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at
254,254.
216. Kenjiro Egashira, Koporeto Gabanansu wo Ronzuru Igi (The Significance of
Corporate Governance), 1364 SHOJI HOMU 2 (1984).
217. Itami, supra note 214.
218. Gospel & Pendleton, supra note 26, at 15. In 1993, in the face of a severe recession,
some Japanese employers cancelled their agreed promises to employ new graduates. The
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employee lay-offs, " which is reflected in Japanese case law and statutes
that prohibit "abuse of the right to dismiss."' As a result, like German
corporate managers, Japanese managers are less focused on corporate
strategies that maximize short-run profits?' and see share-holders, rather
than employees, as the ones who must absorb economic fluctuations
through variations in profits.
It is perhaps hard for Americans, who come from a perspective of
share-holder or management primacy and employee subordination, to
conceive of how the Japanese, including Japanese managers, would
develop such norms. The secret is the Japanese practice of promoting
from within the firm, both for positions of management and for
positions on the Board of Directors. 222 As a result of internal
promotion, in Japan the majority of corporate managers and members
of the Boards of Directors have a long history as employees of the firm,
and it is quite natural that they would value the employee perspective
and consider it dishonorable to turn on their former colleagues.'
Indeed it is common practice for about half of the corporate Board of
Directors to be "directors-with-employee-functions," current employees
or managers whose role is to represent the interests of their department
on the Board24 Also, because of Japan's wide-spread practice of
enterprise unionism and employee membership in unions, it is common
for corporate managers and directors to have previously been union
members in the same corporation. A recent Top Management Survey
showed that 28% of top management in Japanese corporations had
previously been leaders in the enterprise union for the corporation.'
Japanese Ministry of Labor published the names of the employers who cancelled the
contracts in order to shame them, and the act was soundly condemned by the Japanese public.
Araki, supra note 215, at 271.
219. Araki, supra note 215, at 270.
220. Id. at 267.
221. It also helps that the Japanese, like the Germans, enjoy "patient capital" in that
they have many more large banks and institutional investors and inter-locking ownership of
corporations, and much less threat of hostile take-over, so that Japanese investors are more
willing to take a long-run perspective on what's best for the firm. Id. at 255.
222. Id.
223. The Top Management Survey shows that 76% of Board members in Japan were
promoted from within the corporation and the remaining 24% come from parent or affiliated
firms. "Outside" directors are virtually unknown in Japan. Araki, supra note 187, at 324.
Also, because of this internal promotion, there is much less difference in class and pay
between the average employee and the average member of the Board of Directors in Japan
than in the United States. Araki, supra note 215, at 264.
224. Araki, supra note 215, at 264, 278.
225. Araki, supra note 187, at 339.
816 [94:765
HeinOnline  -- 94 Marq. L. Rev. 816 2010-2011
PROMOTING EMPLOYEE VOICE
The presence of current and former employees in management and on
the Board of Directors, combined with the Japanese practice of
consultation between labor and management, ensure that employee
perspectives are well represented in the governance and management of
the corporation.
The Japanese system of industrial relations is based on the concept
of the company as "a community of shared fate."226 As the name
suggests, this concept promotes the idea that all of the company's stake-
holders, labor, management, and shareholders, will either prosper
together or fail together. Pursuant to this principle, Japanese managers
have encouraged lifetime employment relationships, direct employee
interest in the profitability of the firm, and frequent consultation
between managers and employees concerning a wide variety of
employment related topics. Many workers in Japan are hired with the
expectation that the firm will employ them on an uninterrupted basis for
the rest of their life.227 Moreover, because promotions are generally
made from within the firm, employees have strong incentives to commit
themselves to working for the same firm for their entire work life, and
managers have a strong commitment to their firm and the employees of
the firm.m As an accommodation to the Buddhist Bon Festival and
New Year celebrations, Japanese workers receive two lump-sum
payments each year, which on average, are equal to about four months
salary. The size of these lump-sum payments depends on the
profitability of the employee's firm, tying employee compensation
directly to the profitability of the firm.' Finally, Japanese management
has made a strong commitment to consultation and the exchange of
information at all levels of the firm. This commitment includes a system
of joint consultation between labor and management on the day-to-day
running of the plant, small group discussions among workers on
methods of production such as the well-known quality circles, and a
corporate board of directors composed predominantly of past or current
employees.
226. Kuwahara, supra note 190, at 257.
227. Id. at 254.
22& Id. at 260.
229. Id.
230. Haruo Shimada, Japan's Postwar Industrial Growth and Labor-Management
Relations, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 241, 245-48 (Barbara D. Dennis ed., 1983); see also
Kuwahara, supra note 190, at 258-60.
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Japan has also developed an extensive system of laws regulating the
conduct of labor relations. The Japanese have no formal method for
selecting a bargaining representative and treat the question of union
representation as a matter of individual freedom of association for the
workers." The Japanese also have no concept of exclusive
representation. Different employees with the same employer may
designate different unions as their representative.3 2  In practice,
however, one organization generally dominates within a firm and
bargains with the firm on a corporate basis, and about half of Japanese
unions have union shop agreements requiring union membership as a
condition of employment.' Employers have an affirmative obligation
to bargain in good faith with any representative designated by their
employees, but there is no corresponding obligation for the union to
bargain in good faith.' The employer's obligation to bargain in good
faith can be enforced through an administrative unfair labor practice
proceeding similar to that employed in the United States, or through a
private civil suit by the union. Remedies for a failure to bargain in good
faith include an injunction and tort damages for lost wages and
benefits.' Collective agreements, including agreements not to strike,
are fully enforceable in Japan, although it seems the Japanese rely more
on the court system for this task than on private arbitration.m Indeed,
Japanese courts will infer a "peace obligation" on the part of both
parties to a collective bargaining agreement to carry out the terms of
that agreement-without resort to economic warfare during the life of
the agreement-even if the agreement does not contain an express no-
strike clause.27 Currently, about 18.2% of Japan's employees are
represented by a union? This, combined with the Japanese system of
promoting managers and directors from the employees within the
corporation, ensures that employee perspectives are well represented in
Japanese labor relations.
Empirical evidence comparing the Japanese and American systems
of corporate governance and labor relations suggests that there are
some real advantages to the Japanese system. Japanese companies rely
231. KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE LABOR LAW 434-35 (Leo Kanowitz trans., 1992).
232. Id. at 471-72.
233. Id. at 438.
234. Id. at 494.
235. Id. at 494-95.
236. Id at 522.
237. Id. at 520-21.
238. ALFS Summary Tables, supra note 206.
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much less on layoffs to deal with economic fluctuations, preferring
instead to accept fluctuations in profits and even decreases in wages. 23
This allows the Japanese to make more investments in firm-specific
human capital and lowers turnover costs.' While the United States
seems to enjoy advantages in market flexibility, job creation, and
innovation, the secret of the Japanese system to providing high wages
and low unemployment seems to be job training, a higher savings rate,
and a gradual systematic approach to change.24 For most of the post-
war period, Japanese employment and training institutions have
provided higher growth and less income inequality than their American
counterparts.242 Japanese managers have a longer term planning
perspective than American managers,243 and work for much less money.
According to the Towers Perrin's 2006 survey, for industrial companies
with over $500 million in sales, American CEOs enjoyed an average
annual total compensation of $2.16 million, 62% of which was incentive
pay, while Japanese CEOs on average were paid merely $543,564 with
only 22% of that comprising incentive pay, about the same percent in
incentive pay received by their employees.2" Indeed, at least in the
recent past, it has been a common belief among Japanese managers that
American managers are paid too much and take too many of the
benefits of the firm for themselves.245
3. Criticisms of the Coordinated Market Systems of Germany and
Japan
There have, of course, been some criticisms of the coordinated
market systems of Germany and Japan. Furubotn has argued that the
coordinated market systems give employees a say in corporate
governance that is disproportionate to their capital investment and thus
introduce an inefficient management structure because they separate
239. Robert A. Hart & James R. Malley, Excess Labour and the Business Cycle: A
Comparative Study of Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, 63
ECONOMICA 325, 334 (1996). It is a common Japanese practice that Japanese workers will
receive some of their income as a bonus that depends on the company's profits, which of
course decline in hard times lowering wages. Kuwahara, supra note 190, at 260.
240. Hart & Malley, supra note 239, at 334.
241. CLAIR BROWN ET AL., WORK AND PAY IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 3-7
(1997).
242 See id. at 158-92.
243. Sam Beldona et al., Are Japanese Managers More Long-Term Oriented Than United
States Managers?, 38 MGMT. INT'L REV. 239,239 (1998).
244. Thomas, supra note 203, at 187-89.
245. VOGEL, supra note 210, at 154.
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corporate decision-making from financial responsibility.4 This
criticism, however, ignores the employees' human capital investment in
the firm. Based on the German and Japanese experiences, one can
reasonably argue that the American system is less efficient and actually
discourages efficient employee investment in-and commitment to-the
firm.2 47 Coupled with the argument that the coordinated market system
is less efficient, Jensen and Meckling have argued that if
codetermination was really more efficient, firms would voluntarily
undertake it and the Germans would not have to require consultation by
law.2' However, the Japanese system of coordinated markets seems at
least as organically derived and spontaneous as our own system of
shareholder value, raising the question of which leads to market-driven
efficiency and under what circumstances. Moreover, even if German
codetermination is wealth or social welfare maximizing, managers and
shareholders may not voluntarily consent to it because it yields a larger
share of the surplus for workers and a smaller share for capital.249
Accordingly, management and capital's resistance to codetermination
may in fact frustrate efficiency or social welfare maximization and must
be overcome with regulation. There are some indications that recently
both the German and Japanese systems have evolved to accept some
features of the American market-oriented system; both the Germans
and Japanese have recently acted to lessen the power of large
institutional investors and add flexibility to their labor markets?'
Nevertheless, it seems doubtful they will adopt wholesale the American
system and much more likely that the "hybrid" system they adopt will
retain codetermination and a much higher level of employee voice in
corporate governance and labor relations than exists in the United
States?' The question is how do we move to a more successful hybrid of
our own by drawing on the German and Japanese experiences?
246. Eirik G. Furubotn, Codetermination and the Modern Theory of the Firm: A
Property-Rights Analysis, 61 J. Bus. 165, 178 (1988).
247. Frick & Lehman, supra note 199, at 136-37.
248. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An
Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. OF BUS. 469,474 (1979).
249. Freeman & Lazear, supra note 188, at 29.
250. Araki, supra note 215, at 280-81 (describing the Japanese market); Jackson et al.,
supra note 7, at 99-105 (describing the German market).
251. Araki, supra note 215, at 281; Jackson et al., supra note 7, at 101-02.
820 [94:765
HeinOnline  -- 94 Marq. L. Rev. 820 2010-2011
PROMOTING EMPLOYEE VOICE
V. PROMOTING EMPLOYEE VOICE IN CORPORATE AMERICA
As a result of the United States' strong reliance on the share value
theory of corporate governance and individual bargaining in labor
relations, American workers have less say in the production process
than workers in perhaps any other developed democracy in the world.
Professor Estlund has termed this lack of employee voice in the
American workplace the "democracy deficit." 2 2 Not surprisingly,
American workers are not happy with having so little say in corporate
policies and labor relations. As Freeman and Roger's 1999 survey
showed, fully 63% of American workers would like more input into
workplace decisions, and most workers would like that influence to
come through employee representatives or in cooperation with fellow
employees, not through individual bargaining?.3 Even employers say
they would like more information from employees, and regularly test
the limits of section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA,m although it is clear they
would like to gather information from employees through employer-
sponsored committees, rather than independent employee unions.
Moreover, as we have seen previously in this essay, there is good
evidence that our failure to take advantage of employee voice is not
good for American workers or the American economy. How might we
address this problem?
A. Promoting Employee Voice in American Corporate Governance
American corporate governance currently suffers from an inordinate
focus on the short-run price of the firm's stock, and this obsession has
proved unhealthy for both American workers and the American
economy. This inordinate focus arises from several causes: absent and
"impatient" shareholders who have inadequate control over corporate
management, executive compensation schemes that ally management
interests with the short-run value of firm stock, and the almost complete
absence of effective employee voice in American corporate governance.
There are several ways we might address these underlying problems. To
252. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION
TO CO-REGULATION 11 (2010).
253. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 41, 55 (1999);
see also Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging the "Representation Gap," 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L.
391, 391 (2001).
254. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 699, 699 (2001); Electromation,
Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 990 (1992); Robert Moberly, The Story of Electromation- Are
Employee Participation Programs a Competitive Necessity or a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?, in
LABOR LAW STORIES (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine J. Fiske eds., 2005).
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prevent corporations from avoiding these changes by merely changing
their state domicile, these reforms will have to be enacted either through
federal law or a uniform code adopted by all states. Given the
unlikelihood of the latter option, I think it best that these problems be
addressed by Congress. Fortunately, there have been two recent bills
enacted with the purpose of reforming American corporate governance:
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.6 The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act was passed in direct response to the major corporate and accounting
scandals of the early 2000s involving Enron, Tyco International,
Adelphia, Peregrine Systems, and WorldCom.' As previously
discussed, these scandals cost investors billions of dollars and shook
public confidence in the nation's securities markets. The Act is aimed
largely at ensuring accuracy in corporate accounting and reporting
practices that is essential in any meaningful system of corporate
governance.2 The Dodd-Frank Act was passed in response to the
recent near collapse of financial markets also discussed in this essay.
Some of its provisions address problems discussed in this essay and,
where appropriate, I will mention those provisions among my
proposals.29 Unfortunately, neither Act was aimed at promoting
255. Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
256. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
257. Corporate Excesses Fuel Regulation, Gov. FIN. REV., at 47, Dec. 12, 2002; The
Long Arm of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, WASH. TIMES, at B2, Dec. 15,2002.
258. Sarbanes-Oxley contains eleven titles that describe specific mandates and
requirements for financial reporting: Title I establishes the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, to provide independent oversight of public accounting firms providing audit
services; Title II establishes standards for external auditor independence, to limit conflicts of
interest; Title III mandates that senior executives take individual responsibility for the
accuracy and completeness of corporate financial reports; Title IV prescribes enhanced
reporting requirements for financial transactions and requires internal controls for assuring
the accuracy of financial reports and disclosures; Title V defines codes of conduct for
securities analysts and requires disclosure of knowable conflicts of interest; Title VI defines
the SEC's authority to censure or bar securities professionals from practice and defines
conditions under which a person can be barred from practicing as a broker, advisor, or dealer;
Title VII the Comptroller General and the SEC to perform various studies and report their
findings; Title VIII prescribes criminal penalties for manipulation, destruction or alteration
of financial records or other interference with investigations, while providing protection for
whistle-blowers; Title IX increases the criminal penalties associated with white-collar crimes
and conspiracies; Title X requires the Chief Executive Officer to sign the company tax return;
Title XI identifies corporate fraud and records tampering as criminal offenses and joins those
offenses to specific penalties. See generally Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
259. Corporate Governance issues are addressed in Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act-
designated the "Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010." In this Title
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employee voice in corporate governance.
First, we should encourage American share-holders to be present
patient capital, rather than absent impatient capital, and empower them
to rein in managerial excesses. The provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
granting the Security and Exchange Commission authority to adopt
regulations requiring that corporations provide procedures for
shareholders to nominate directors through the company's proxy
process are a good start.2 Prior to this provision, shareholders were
often left to vote only on unopposed nominees for the Board put forth
by management-a procedure that provided inadequate monitoring of
management. It is yet to be seen whether these regulations will have
meaningful impact, but it is a useful attempt to give shareholders a more
active role in the governance of the firm. We might also place term
limits on the members of the Board of Directors to ensure that they do
not become too entangled with management. The British impose such
term limits for just this reason. 6' Other provisions might be enacted to
promote shareholder power in the firm; in particular, we might amend
ERISA to allow employee pension plans to act on and represent
employee interests in the firm beyond just maximizing share price for
retirement. Professor Marleen O'Connor has been one of the earliest
and most convincing academic advocates for greater roles for pension
plans and employees as stock owners in corporate governance. 2" From
the perspective of encouraging patient capital, the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code providing for lower tax rates for "long-term"
Congress provides: Security and Exchange Commission authority to adopt regulations
providing shareholder access to nominate directors through the company's proxy process; a
requirement of non-binding mandatory shareholder votes on executive compensation and
"golden parachute" payments, as to which matters brokers may not vote undirected shares;
Security and Exchange Commission authority to mandate compensation "clawback" if
executive compensation is based on inaccurate financial statements; national securities
exchanges authority to require the independence of compensation committee members, and
to grant committee authority to hire independent compensation consultants; and directions
that the Security and Exchange Commission issue rules requiring proxy disclosure regarding
executive compensation, equity securities hedging by company's employees or directors, and
whether or not the company has divided the CEO and board chairman roles. Investor
Protection and Securities Reform Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
260. Id. § 951.
261. JOHN GILLESPIE & DAVID ZWEIG, How THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE BOARDS
Is RUINING AMERICAN BUSINESS AND COSTING Us TRILLIONS 263 (2010).
262. Marleen A. O'Connor, Labor's Role in the American Corporate Governance
Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97, 97 (2000); Marleen A. O'Connor, Organized
Labor as Shareholder Activist. Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1345,1346 (1997).
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capital gains make sense.26 However, the current "long-term" for
special tax treatment is only one year. It might be advisable to offer
additional incentives for capital held five, ten, or even fifteen years.
Second, we should encourage American management to develop
independent long-term interests, and perhaps even interests in the
welfare of their employees. If managers are going to receive a portion
of their remuneration in stock, we should limit the amount of that
remuneration to no more than 20% of the total compensation package,
or require that the manager hold the stock for no less than ten years
before it can be redeemed. The Dodd-Frank Act has made some
changes to the law that are intended to provide an independent basis for
determining executive compensation and limiting that compensation.
The Act provides for independent corporate compensation committee
members and consultants, directs the Securities and Exchange
Commission to issue rules requiring proxy disclosure of executive
compensation and equity securities and provides for non-binding
shareholder votes on executive compensation.26 At a minimum I would
think shareholders are entitled to a binding vote on executive
compensation.26 It would also seem useful to tie executive
compensation to the compensation and benefits of their employees,
either as a factor to be considered by the company's compensation
committee or as a legislated maximum-say 100 times the total paid for
salaries and wages divided by the number of employees. This would
give managers incentive to take into account the returns to their
employees in working for the firm and investing their human capital and
lives, just as they take into account the returns to shareholders. The
SEC rules implementing the Dodd-Frank Act require companies to
report both executive compensation and a measure of the median
263. Short-term capital gains (held one year or less) are subject to ordinary income tax
rates up to 35%. Long-term capital gains (held for more than one year) are subject to a 0-
15% tax rate depending on the person's tax bracket. I.R.C. § 1(7)(h) (2006).
264. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
265. See Rebecca A. Crawford, Comment, Corporate Governance Reform: How to
Promote the Long-Term Health and Value of U.S. Corporations, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 905,
919-24 (2009). Crawford explainins that shareholders would also receive independent
evaluations of the corporation's performance and projections and detailing the executive
compensation package which would include at least 50% stock options, which would not start
vesting until one year of service and then continue to vest slowly over time. Id. While
shareholders would vote on the overall compensation, they would be guided by looking at the
FMV of the stock options when distributed and explaining that the shareholders would have
to be provided a detailed list of the components of the compensation package and a
breakdown of the company's profits attributable to market movement and not management
efficacy. Id.
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employee pay for the firm, but again there is no binding impact from
this comparison.
Finally, we should require (or strongly encourage) a significant and
meaningful voice for American workers on the corporate Board of
Directors.2" The German and Japanese experiences show that there is
just no substitute for this in terms of promoting the long-term interests
of the firm or the larger interests of society.' We could follow the
German model of requiring employee representation only on firms of a
certain size, and increasing such representation as the firms grow in size.
Small firms that are owner-operated do not suffer the agency costs
problems of independent management that give rise to most of the
problems discussed in this essay, and in these firms management can
directly discuss problems with employees. It seems too much to imagine
American corporations with equal numbers of employee and
shareholder directors, but perhaps we could start by requiring firms with
more than 500 employees to add employee members of the Board of
Directors so that such representatives make up 20% of the Board, and
requiring firms with more than 2,000 employees to add employee
members of the Board of Directors so that such representatives make
up 33% of the Board. The employee representatives could be elected to
staggered terms so that elections are held every year or two. These
elections and representatives would provide information to the
employees, and an opportunity to meaningfully discuss and debate the
policies of the firm68 The representatives would also provide capital
with an important ally in monitoring management, and management an
266. Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 24 (2008) (stating that "employees could elect a proportion of the board,
communities in which the company employs a significant percentage of the workforce could
propose a representative for the board and long-term business partners and creditors could be
represented as well"); Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and
Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 608 (2002);
O'Connor, supra note 33, at 904 (stating that under the "neutral referee model" proposal,
directors would serve as neutral referees to balance the competing initerests of shareholders
and employees.).
267. Cherie J. Owen, Comment, Board Games: Germany's Monopoly on the Two-Tier
System of Corporate Governance and Why the Post-Enron United States Would Benefit from
Its Adoption, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 167, 185-86 (2003).
268. Professor Matthew Bodie has made the interesting proposal that firms should be
required to undertake a non-binding employee referendum for transformative transactions
that would augment the current shareholder voting system. Matthew T. Bodie, The Case for
Employee Referenda on Transformative Transactions as Shareholder Proposals, 87 WASH. U.
L.R. 897, 897 (2010); Bodie, supra note 8, at 878, 899, 900. Such referenda would provide an
opportunity for providing information to employees and getting their input on important
matters.
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important ally in selling long-term strategies to the shareholders. Where
the employees are represented by a union, employee representation on
the Board of Directors would encourage cooperative labor relations and
help limit industrial strife. Perhaps most important of all, such
representation would help change management and shareholder
attitudes towards employees so that employees would be seen as
partners rather than a commodity.
B. Promoting Employee Voice in American Labor Relations
American labor relations suffer from a lack of employee voice in
setting the terms and conditions of employment. No other
industrialized democracy on earth gives employers so much power to
command and change the terms and conditions of employment.
America is unique in its adherence to the at-will rule.6 In Germany,
employers are prohibited by statute from making "socially unwarranted
dismissal" and must give advance notice of terminations not only to the
employee, but also to his Works Council which can object and contest
the termination in a labor court while the employee remains
employed.7 Indeed, all European countries, even Great Britain, have
at least some statutory protection against "unjust dismissal" and the
employer unilaterally terminating the employment contract. In Japan
"just cause" protection has been interpreted into the Constitution, and
advance notice of the termination of employment contracts is required
by law.2" The United States is also exceptional in the low percentage of
workers it has covered by collective bargaining agreements. Virtually
all of the European countries and Japan have higher union density
numbers, and even in those that are lower (for example, France),
collective negotiations determine the terms and conditions of
employment for a much higher percentage of employeesm In many
countries, for example Germany and the Scandinavian countries, terms
and conditions of employment are commonly based on national
standards determined through tripartite discussions among labor,
management, and the government. Similarly mature industrial
democracies commonly employ less formal and less costly means of
adjudicating employee complaints under the contract or law, works
269. Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J.
COMP. L. 310,311 (1985).
270. Id. at 314-15.
271. Id at 317.
272. INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 379 tbl.A.18
(Greg J. Bamber et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004).
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council discussions, and labor courts or arbitration. As a result,
employees in those countries have a better opportunity to enforce the
terms of employment they achieve. How can we promote greater
employee voice in American labor relations?
First we should undertake efforts to promote employee voice in the
workplace even in the absence of independent unions. I think we need
to address our system of at-will employment combined with unilateral
offer and acceptance, which leaves employees almost entirely out of the
loop in determining the terms and conditions of employment through
individual bargaining. A statutory system of moderate but mandatory
severance pay in the absence of an employer showing of good cause,
combined with a statutory or common law standard of "reasonable
notice" for changes in indefinite contract terms would slow down our
system of individual bargaining giving employees some time to give
input or else look for another job.27 The whole system could be
efficiently enforced through our unemployment compensation system in
which employers already have to adjudicate the question of just cause
for dismissal in order to deny benefits. To entice employers to sign on
to the system, we could limit the scope or damages available in wrongful
discharge suits and accept fair procedures for individual arbitration of
such claims. Such a system would be more efficient and provide more
severance benefits to a broader array of workers-sort of a workers'
compensation system for employee discharge.
We should also consider requiring or encouraging the use of elected
employee committees on a variety of workplace subjects."4 Although
the United States will probably never have a system as extensive as the
German Works Councils, I am always surprised at the willingness of
even some of my most pro-employer students to consider the idea of
employee committees on subjects such as safety, productivity, and
working conditions. American employers also seem anxious for a way
to communicate with employee representatives on a variety of topics,
given the frequency with which they test the limits of Section 8(a)(2) of
the NLRA prohibiting Company Unions.2 " We could consider
273. See, e.g., P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185 (1985).
274. Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation is Required in a Declining
Union Environment to Provide Employees with Meaningful Industrial Democracy, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 135, 170 (1997).
275. In 1996, Congress passed the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995,
H.R. 743, 104th Congress (1996), to allow employee participation committees that would not
violate Section 8(a)(2). The measure never became law, however, because it was vetoed by
President Clinton. Arthur J. Martin, Company Sponsored Employee Involvement: A Union
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requiring employers over a certain size to have elected committees on a
variety of subjects, or merely encourage such committees by providing
employers with a safe harbor from Section 8(a)(2) if they followed
certain procedures to ensure representativeness and independence and
made necessary information available to the employee committees. In
this regard, we might consider some of the suggestions of Professor
Finkin on employee committees, and some of Professor Estlund's ideas
on responsible self-regulation and promoting constructive "co-
regulation" between the parties.276
Second, we should undertake efforts to promote employee voice
through independent unions. In this regard, the Employee Free Choice
Act currently being considered in Congress is a helpful starting point.27
As announced in its first section, the bill's purpose is to "amend the
National Labor Relations Act to establish an efficient system to enable
employees to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to provide for
mandatory injunctions for unfair labor practices during organizing
efforts, and for other purposes."278 The bill attempts to achieve this
purpose through three objectives. First, the bill would rescind the
employer's right to demand an election and would allow a union to be
certified as the exclusive representative of the employees on the basis of
representation cards signed by a majority of workers in an appropriate
unit.2" This would allow unions to avoid employer abuses of delays and
unfair labor practices during the course of an election campaign, which
some employers now use to avoid representation. Second, the bill
would also require employers and unions to enter into binding
arbitration to produce a collective agreement within 120 days after a
union is recognized, if one cannot be achieved through collective
bargaining? This is intended to address the current problem that in
Perspective, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 119, 137 (1996) (stating that the TEAM Act and other
similar efforts are "nothing more or less than attempts to legitimize the company unions that
flourished in the darkest days of early industrialization in order to frustrate employees' efforts
to organize"); see also Rafael Gely, Where Are We Now: Life After Electromation, 15
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 45-48 (1997) (discussing the TEAM Act, but arguing that
Electromation did little to change the legal landscape and therefore uncertainty that existed
before the decision).
276. ESTLUND, supra note 252, at 25; see Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Representation
Outside the Labor Act: Thoughts on Arbitral Representation, Group Arbitration, and
Workplace Committees, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 75,89-100 (2002).
277. The Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).
27& Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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almost half of successful union election campaigns, the union selected by
the employees to represent them never achieves a first contract.
Finally, the bill would increase penalties on employers who commit
unfair labor practices.' There is no doubt that the current doctrine that
the NLRA is merely remedial and provides no basis for punitive fines
fails to provide adequate incentives for employers to obey the law.w
Of course, the Employee Free Choice Act currently lies moribund in
Congress with little chance of passage in its current, or any, form. The
inability of the Senate to even consider relatively modest changes to the
NLRA when it is so clearly out of date and failing to achieve its
objective of fostering employee voice is a strong indictment of our
legislative process. If reasoned debate were possible within the halls of
Congress, and if electoral majorities meant anything, there are some
other amendments to the NLRA that should be considered. If we are
going to retain elections as the primary method through which
employees choose a representative, we should undertake some very
simple and common sense changes to improve the efficacy of our
election process. First, employees under the Act should have full and
easy access to their fellow employees for the purpose of organizing and
collective action, like Congress clearly intended in enacting the Wagner
Act. Congress or the Court should overturn the Court's opinion in
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB' and reaffirm the express language of the Act
to make it clear that protected employees do not have to be the
employees of a "particular employer"a in order to collectively exercise
281. WEILER, supra note 51, at 250.
282. H.R. 1409.
283. J. FREEDLEY HUNSICKER, JR. ET AL., NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES 2 (1986); WEILER, supra note 51, at 247-552; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 75, at 506-
08; William B. Gould IV, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor Relations Act:
The Need for Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REV. 937, 941 (1986); see
Charles J. Morris, The Role of the NLRB and the Courts in the Collective Bargaining Process:
A Fresh Look at the Conventional Wisdom and Unconventional Remedies, 30 VAND. L. REV.
661, 676-87 (1977); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14
WAYNE L. REV. 1039, 1040-41 (1968).
284. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540-41 (1992)
285. ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS' LAW: HOW TO FIGHT THE
ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS 13 (2006). Section 2(3) of the NLRA defines "employee" as
follows:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter
explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work
has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice . . . but shall not include
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full Section 7 rights. At a minimum, employees of a competing
employer or a related employer should have full access to another
employer's employees in non-work areas during non-work time for the
purposes of organizing. Congress or the Court should also make clear
that "full access" includes the right to have fellow employees' addresses,
phone numbers, and e-mail addresses provided by the employer upon
application during an organizing campaign. In order to meaningfully
exercise Section 7 rights, employees have to have access to the common
low-cost methods of communication of mail, telephone, and e-mail.2
Allowing employers to suppress this information on the basis of
minuscule and nebulous private property claims" needlessly frustrates
the exercise of employee Section 7 rights and the Supreme Court's
opinion in Republic Aviation.' Finally, Congress or the Court should
make clear that if an employer provides access to employees for non-
profit organizations or charities for any purpose, or to himself for the
purpose of lobbying against a union, then he has to give the union equal
access to that of the other organizations, or a chance to respond to his
criticisms, otherwise the employer discriminates against employees on
the basis of their collective activity in violation of Section 8(a)(3). By
ensuring that employees have access to low- cost methods of
communicating with each other, we help promote employee
organization and voice, and avoid the needless waste of union
resources.M
Finally, we should reconsider the elevated place of the doctrine of
exclusive representation in our labor relations practice and law.
Exclusive representation is an obstacle to the exercise of employee voice
because it requires majority representation and tends to ensnare us in
protracted election campaigns to determine an issue of legal
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by
his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent
contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act ....
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
286. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 262,262 (2008); Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt Jr., The National Labor
.Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV.
1,34 (2000).
287. See e.g., Tech. Serv. Solutions 1, 332 N.L.R.B. 1096 (2000); Trs. of Columbia Univ.,
350 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (2007)
288. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 793-99 (1945); see also Malin &
Perritt, supra note 286, at 45.
289. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 75, at 487.
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representation that in any other setting would be a matter of personal
choice. It also sweeps employees who honestly dissent from being
represented by the union into a position in which their representative is
chosen without their actual consent. Union representation under these
conditions is resented and leads to needless litigation under the duty of
fair representation. Professor Charlie Morris has argued that our
current heavy reliance on the doctrine of exclusive representation and
majority bargaining is misplaced under the language and legislative
history of the NLRA and labor relations practices at the time of the
passage of the Act.2' He argues that minority union bargaining is not
only allowed under the Act, but that employers are required to bargain
in good faith with the representatives of minority unions on behalf of
their members. It is only when unions actually want to establish
themselves as the exclusive representative that they need to resort to
more elaborate methods than a card check, for example a Board
election.291 Regardless of whether Professor Morris' arguments prevail
in the interpretation of the current law, Congress should consider doing
away with the doctrine of exclusive representation. Almost no other
countries in the world subscribe to this doctrine and it has proven a real
obstacle to employee voice.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The recent performance of American corporations suggests that
there are serious problems in the American system of corporate
governance and labor relations. The near collapse of our financial
system in 2008 demonstrated that our system of lucratively rewarding
management based on stock prices under the "shareholder theory of
value" results in an inordinate focus by U.S. management on short-run
profits that poses a serious threat to the health of our economy.
Accounting scandals, environmental disasters, and the failure of the
U.S. auto industry to adequately adapt to anticipated consumer demand
all show that this inordinate focus on short-run profits is not confined to
the financial industry, but exists in large corporations across the
American economy. Under the American system of corporate
governance there is inadequate ownership control and inadequate input
290. CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 1 (2005).
291. Charles J. Morris, Collective Rights as Human Rights: Fulfilling Senator Wagner's
Promise of Democracy in the Workplace-The Blue Eagle Can Fly Again, 39 U.S.F. L. REV.
701, 710-712 (2005).
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from workers, resulting in excessive managerial compensation and a
paucity of long-run strategies and investments to the detriment of
American businesses, workers, and the American economy as a whole.
The recent decline in the fortunes of American workers
demonstrates that the American system of individual bargaining results
in too little attention to the interests of workers and too little investment
in long-term employment relationships and human capital. The doctrine
of employment at will, combined with unilateral offer and acceptance,
gives American management control over the terms and conditions of
employment that is unrivaled among industrialized democracies in the
world. Individually, employees also have too few resources and too
little incentive to enforce the terms and conditions of employment. In
the absence of collective voice, employee interests are not adequately
represented in American labor relations, resulting in too little
investment in public goods and human capital. As a result, American
workers are on a path to occupy a niche as moderately trained,
moderately paid flexible labor in the world economy. The wages of
American workers remain stagnant while they absorb ever greater risk
of unemployment and fluctuations in healthcare and pension benefits.
American corporate governance and labor relations would benefit
from greater employee participation. If workers were given a greater
voice in corporate governance, -shareholders would gain an ally in
monitoring management and making decisions with inside information
on the operation of the firm, and management would gain an ally with
convincing capital to invest in the long-run interest of the firm.
Production could be organized with management and workers as
stakeholders with long-term interests and fluctuations in profits
absorbed by capital rather than through wasteful layoffs. In this regard,
the systems of corporate governance employed in Germany and Japan
that account for employee views either through legislatively required
codetermination or the socially constructed "community of shared fate"
are instructive. Moreover, if workers were given a greater voice in labor
relations it would help solve many of the problems generated by our
system of individual bargaining. Worker collective voice would help
solve asymmetries in information between management and labor, and
aid in the efficient consumption of public goods and enforcement of the
terms and conditions of employment. Once again, the institutions
employed in Germany and Japan to conduct labor relations present
useful lessons.
The United States should adopt legislative measures to promote
employee voice in corporate governance and labor relations. Our
[94:765832
HeinOnline  -- 94 Marq. L. Rev. 832 2010-2011
2011] PROMOTING EMPLOYEE VOICE 833
economy suffers from an excess of management discretion and greed in
the running of our largest corporations, and these excesses threaten the
position of our economy in the world and the futures of our children.
Greater employee voice in the running of our largest corporations can
play an important role in checking these excesses and putting our
economy on a solid footing for future economic growth and prosperity
benefiting all Americans.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Nonfarm Business Hourly Output and
Hourly Wage Indexes (1947=100), 947-2009
Year Output Wage Year Output Wage Year Output Wage
1947 100.00 100.00 1968 181.63 177.96 1989 251.27 216.32
1948 102.82 100.53 1969 181.93 180.24 1990 255.89 218.76
1949 106.26 104.75 1970 184.65 182.69 1991 259.83 222.28
1950 113.36 109.60 1971 192.03 186.17 1992 270.22 228.40
1951 116.42 110.41 1972 198.40 192.10 1993 271.72 227.37
1952 118.49 114.29 1973 204.64 195.59 1994 274.51 226.61
1953 121.20 119.75 1974 201.35 193.33 1995 275.63 225.92
1954 123.53 122.63 1975 206.89 194.98 1996 282.75 227.28
1955 128.78 127.63 1976 213.78 199.91 1997 287.08 229.40
1956 127.82 133.44 1977 217.13 202.99 1998 295.51 239.78
1957 131.10 136.65 1978 219.98 206.42 1999 305.32 244.97
1958 134.02 138.12 1979 219.09 206.12 2000 315.69 254.68
1959 139.17 142.53 1980 218.51 205.33 2001 324.92 258.77
1960 140.81 146.16 1981 221.59 205.61 2002 339.74 262.76
1961 145.16 149.49 1982 219.23 207.71 2003 352.16 269.30
1962 151.74 153.93 1983 228.87 207.53 2004 362.13 271.10
1963 157.06 157.11 1984 233.49 207.54 2005 368.16 272.76
1964 161.67 159.96 1985 237.29 209.58 2006 371.68 274.19
1965 166.67 162.65 1986 244.61 216.64 2007 378.50 277.71
1966 172.61 167.48 1987 245.32 217.15 2008 386.23 275.58
1967 175.62 171.95 1988 249.36 220.01 2009 400.66 281.62
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Data Sets
http://www.bls.gov/lpc/#data, http://www.bls.gov/datal
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Table 2: Non-Supervisory Employee Share of
Private Nonfarm Domestic Product
Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent
1964 40.50 1980 35.46 1996 29.58
1965 40.55 1981 34.75 1997 29.72
1966 40.11 1982 34.50 1998 29.93
1967 39.96 1983 33.12 1999 29.73
1968 39.74 1984 32.69 2000 29.54
1969 40.47 1985 32.13 2001 29.43
1970 40.48 1986 31.60 2002 28.94
1971 39.57 1987 31.56 2003 28.07
1972 40.31 1988 31.10 2004 27.27
1973 40.26 1989 30.80 2005 26.93
1974 39.64 1990 30.63 2006 27.08
1975 37.02 1991 30.12 2007 27.22
1976 36.46 1992 29.38 2008 27.52
1977 36.25 1993 29.33 2009 27.10
1978 36.22 1994 29.47
1979 36.01 1995 29.58 1
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Data Sets
http://www.bls.gov/lpc/#data, http://www.bls.gov/datal
Ave Ann Hrs (Table B7) * Ave Nom Hrly Wage (Table
B9) / Privt Nonfarm GDP (Table B 10)
Table 3: Share of National Income Enjoyed by the Top Fifth and
Bottom Three Fifths of the US Population (Percent), 1947-2006
Bottom
Three Top
Year Fifths Fifth
1947 33.9 43.0
1973 34.9 41.1
1979 34.5 41.4
1989 31.7 44.6
2000 29.5 47.7
2006 28.6 48.5
Source: LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING
AMERICA 2008/2009, 61, tbl.1.7 (2009).
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Table 4: National Income Share of To 10% of US Po ulation, 1917-2008
Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent
1917 40.51 1936 46.59 1955 33.94 1974 33.31 1993 40.68
1918 40.11 1937 44.23 1956 33.46 1975 33.43 1994 40.78
1919 40.32 1938 44.07 1957 32.99 1976 33.41 1995 42.11
1920 39.01 1939 45.52 1958 33.56 1977 33.58 1996 43.48
1921 43.18 1940 45.29 1959 34.00 1978 33.49 1997 44.64
1922 43.72 1941 41.93 1960 33.48 1979 34.21 1998 45.39
1923 41.46 1942 36.13 1961 34.25 1980 34.63 1999 46.47
1924 44.41 1943 33.69 1962 33.70 1981 34.54 2000 47.61
1925 46.35 1944 32.51 1963 33.78 1982 35.33 2001 44.82
1926 45.71 1945 34.42 1964 34.42 1983 36.38 2002 43.82
1927 46.67 1946 36.70 1965 34.78 1984 36.74 2003 44.53
1928 49.29 1947 34.35 1966 33.67 1985 37.56 2004 46.40
1929 46.71 1948 35.01 1967 34.44 1986 40.63 2005 48.33
1930 43.87 1949 34.75 1968 34.85 1987 38.25 2006 49.32
1931 44.54 1950 35.56 1969 33.93 1988 40.63 2007 49.74
1932 46.37 1951 34.22 1970 32.63 1989 40.08 2008 48.23
1933 45.60 1952 33.21 1971 33.34 1990 39.98
1934 45.78 1953 32.31 1972 33.59 1991 39.55
1935 44.49 1954 33.64 1973 33.33 1992 40.82
Source: Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the
United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 1-39 (2003), available at
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/- saez/.
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